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JAPAN'S COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY AND JAPANESE ECONOMIC
AID TO AND COOPERATION WITH THE ASEAN COUNTRIES.
For Japan, having a large population and little natural
resources, economic security- the assurance of uninterrupted imports of
raw materials and energies and the availability of export markets to
finance these imports- is, therefore, its primary national concern.
Changes in the global political and economic environments since
the late 1960s have drastically altered Japan's perception of its
strengths, needs and international responsibilities. These developments
compounded by constraints on military expansion have compelled Japan to
adopt a Comprehensive National Security Strategy beginning the 1970s
to protect and enhance the country's national security interests.
The ASEAN(Association of Southeast Asian Nations) countries are
particularly important to Japan in this scheme due to their strategic
physical attributes and their growing regional and international
political significance. The Japanese and ASEAN economies are highly
complimentary and generous Japanese economic assistance to these
developing ASEAN economies has drawn them closer to Japan. Closer
relations insert the ASEAN countries is desired by Japan as their
support and cooperation are essential to the realization of Japan's
national goals of continuing economic growth, development and world
peace and stability.
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2CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
In the two decades after the conclusion of the Asian-Pacific War,
Japan had poured all its energy into rebuilding its war-torn economy.
The country focused itself on developing close bilateral relations with
the West European countries and the North and South American states to
find markets for its exports. The Asian region, the Middle East and
much of the African continent, in contrast, were considered merely -as
sources for raw materials for a resource-poor but economically booming
Japan.
It had benefitted immensely from American economic assistance and
enjoyed the military protection of the U.S., whose global economic,
political and military might were unchallenged by any power, capitalist
or communist.
But by 1967, the faltering position of America in the Indochinese
imbroglio, its new foreign policy of non-military involvement in Asian
security affairs as underlined by the Nixon Doctrine of 1969, and
finally America's defeat in the Vietnam War in 1975 had drastically
altered Japanese perception of U.S. strength and commitment to the
country's security.
Japan began to take renewed initiative in cultivating better ties
with its Asian neighbors. On security, pressures from Washington forced
Japan to bear greater responsibility in its own national defense.
Japan found it necessary to reassess its foreign policy towards
Asia and the Southeast Asian countries in particular,realizing that
peace and prosperity for itself were impossible without the political
stability and economic progress of the Southeast Asian states and Asia
as a whole. These resource-rich and strategically situated, fragile
3democracies, where vital Japanese national security interests lie, were
directly threatened by Communist aggression from Vietnam and the long-
term implications of the Soviet-Vietnamese alliance.
In response to the changes that were taking place in Indochina,
these Southeast Asian countries also began to take greater initiative in
safeguarding the region's freedom and security, and the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations(ASEAN) was formally created on 8 August 1967 by
its five members: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and
Thailand(Brunei joined in 1984).1 The announced objectives of the ASEAN
were to facilitate intra-regional economic and cultural cooperation.
But since Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea in 1978, the organization has
become more outspoken on regional political issues, with evidently
greater political solidarity, and producing more unified foreign
policies on many issues. The ASEAN members, individually and as a
group, have consistently demanded the complete withdrawal of Vietnamese
troops from Kampuchea.
Japan has maintained good state-to-state relations with each member
of the ASEAN even before its inception in 1967. Cooperation was,
however, largely limited to the economic sphere and on bilateral basis,
making the formulation of a coordinated set of foreign policies towards
the Southeast Asian region an arduous and cumbersome task. The presence
of the ASEAN has, therefore, significantly helped Japan in designing a
unified Southeast Asian policy, and for the ASEAN countries to negotiate
with Tokyo more effectively as a corporate entity on many regional
matters.
In the first decade of Japan-ASEAN relations, economic cooperation
was the main focus of their relationship. But radical politico-military
changes in the Southeast Asian environment since the fall of Saigon has
made it increasingly difficult for Japan to maintain a purely economic
4role in the region. Japan's vested economic interests in the ASEAN
region oblige the country to expand its political and military influence
in the region to ensure Japan's national interests. Yet the
strengthening of the Japan Self-Defense Forces(JSDF) to an extent that
could realistically protect its national security interests, even if
only in the Southeast Asian region, proved to be impossible without
evoking domestic and foreign opposition.
The fear of Japanese remilitarization is strong among these ASEAN
countries, whose population had suffered tremendously under the cruel
dictatorship of their Japanese captors during the war and where millions
had perished fighting for freedom and liberation against the Japanese
Imperial Army. Hence, even the slightest gesture to improve the JSDF's
military capabilities would invite severe criticisms from the ASEAN
states and possibly at the expense of hurting Japan-ASEAN relations.
To compensate this sense of helplessness, Japan has since the late
1970s employed a Comprehensive National Security Strategy. In this
strategy, the country's long-term security in defense, food, and energy
is linked in a non-military way. Both domestic and international
security concerns would be promoted through means other than military
build-up or military alliances, i.e., rather through economic and
cultural cooperation with foreign states.2 Several internal and
external factors convinced Tokyo that economic aid to and cooperation
with other nations, in the form of economic and technical assistance,
public and private loans, and liberalization of the Japanese market,
would be the most effective instrument it can use to promote
international, peace and prosperity.
Since Tokyo proclaimed Japan's determination to forge a closer
relationship with the ASEAN in 1977, every Japanese Prime Minister had
visited the ASEAN region in whole or in part. Each one of them spelled
5out his administration's foreign policy towards the ASEAN, each
reiterating the importance of the ASEAN to Japan.
Economic assistance to the ASEAN is motivated by national interests
as well as humanitarian concerns. It aims to encourage economic growth
and political stability in the Southeast Asian region, prerequisites for
Japanese security, allowing Japan to obtain essential raw materials and
food from the region, permitting safe and free passage of Japanese
merchant fleets and oil tankers(which carry over 70 percent of all
Japanese oil imports into Japan3) through the major Sea Lines of
Communication(SLOCs) that traverse the ASEAN region. The region's
stability would also facilitate Japan's domestic industrial
restructuring, transferring the resource- and labor-intensive industries
to these developing Southeast Asian economies where raw materials and
labor are abundant and inexpensive.
The first major Japanese economic assistance to the ASEAN was the
US$1 billion aid package extended by Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda during
his visit to the region in 1977.4 A succession of other Japanese aid
packages had followed, each larger and more impressive than its
precedent.
The latest of these efforts was the USS2 billion aid package
pledged by Prime Minister Noburo Takeshita in December 1987 at the Third
ASEAN Summit Meeting in Manila. Although economic cooperation remains
the central element of Japan-ASEAN relations, increased emphasis on
greater technology transfer, cultural exchange, and human resource
development has also been made.
The main objective of this paper is to ascertain how Japan uses
economic cooperation with the ASEAN states to enhance its comprehensive
national security interests in the Southeast Asian region and perhaps
beyond. A number of questions are addressed in unveiling the
6complexities. of their relationship: how would economic cooperation with
the ASEAN contribute to Japan's security needs,, in terms of resources,
markets, Japan's international status. etc.? Through what form of
economic cooperation? what transformations were there over the years to
meet the evolving needs of Japan and the ASEAN countries? What other
efforts were there to forge closer ties with the ASEAN states? What are
the responses of the ASEAN to these Japanese initiatives? To end this
thesis, an assessment is made on how Japan-ASEAN relations will develop
in the future in view of the changing international and regional
environments and the possible consequences growing Japan-ASEAN relations
will have on the regional and global environment.
7CHAPTER II
THE COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL SECURITY
STRATEGY AND ITS GOALS
Constitutional restraints plus domestic pacifist sentiments and
international opposition have kept Japan from assuming any substantial
security responsibilities that are commensurate with its economic
status, even within the Asian-Pacific region, thus prompting Japan to
develop its relations with foreign states through economic exchanges.
Japan's incredible post-war economic growth has dazzled many
developed countries and has become the envy and model for emulation by
many developing ones.
Today's Japan is an economic powerhouse that boasts the largest GNP
in the world. It is also the world's largest creditor, with a net
foreign investment of $240 billion. In fiscal year 1988-89, it has
displaced the U.S. as the most generous aid donor in the world.' Much
of these came about because of an international environment that was
favorable to Japan's development.
Back in 1968, Japan already had the second largest GNP in the world
after the U.S. Its economic development since World War II was largely
made possible by two factors: (1) an uninterupted supply of resources
and energy to Japan (2) an undervalued Japanese yen which increased the
competitiveness of Japanese exports in foreign markets. Concurrently,
the existence of a relatively stable global environment facilitated
international trade. Furthermore, with the U.S. shouldering Japan's
defense under the Japan-U.S-.-,se.curity arrangements, Japan can use all
its resources to power domestic socio-economic development.
Despite considerable tensions in international politics in the
1950s and in the early to mid-1960s, general stability and political
balance between the U.S. and the Soviet Union made remote the possiblity
8of any large scale invasion of Japan. Moreover, with the burden of
defense of the Japanese islands borne by America, Japan practically
separated economic security from national defense assuming only nominal
defense responsibilities. The first three defense plans from 1958 to
1971 reflected this attitude. The aims of these plans were only to
strengthen JSDF capabilities to counter conventional aggression of a
localized scale, i.e., only looking after the Japanese islands and the
coastal waters.2
Then events in the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s alerted
Japan of its vulnerability and radically changed its perception of the
world and its position in it. Domestic and foreign socio-economic and
political developments, shifts in international balances of power, and
the emergence of a new international economic order led Japan to really
ponder on the short- and long-term effects of these changes on Japan and
how it should and could respond to these changes.
The U.S. decision to withdraw its troops from Vietnam in 1968,
together with the enunciation of the Nixon Doctrine the following year,
and the U.S. unilateral peace overtures at the Paris Peace Conference
sent a strong and chilling message to Tokyo- that it was the end of an
era of unchallengeable American military superiority.
The balance of power between the two superpowers was perceived by
the Japanese to have tilted to the Soviet Unions's favor. U.S. military
strength appeared to have weakened substantially vis-a-vis the Soviet
Union, and America was unwilling or unable to thwart the expansion of
Communism in Asia, Africa and Central and South America. On a regional
scale, the communization of Indochina with the Soviets occupying and
utilizing the American facilities in Da Nang and Cam Ranh Bay was
particularly worrisome for the Japanese as Japan's economic interests in
Southeast Asia would come under the immediate threat of the Soviets and
the Vietnamese
9Japan's. confidence in the credibility of America's commitment to
Japan's security needs had sharply dwindled since the late 1960s with
the new U.S. foreign policy of non-military involvement in Asian affairs
espoused by Nixon and pressures from Washington to fortify the JSDF.
Reduction of U.S. troops from the region throughout the 1970s further
reinforced this view.3 The unexpected American announcement for
rapprochement with Communist China in 1971 literally shocked Japan,
forcing Japan to have its own rapprochement with Beijing in 1972. Today
a new attitude toward security has evolved in Japan- if anyone is to
truly promote Japanese security it will be the Japanese themselves.4
Japanese economic development also underwent a a series of
challenges in the early 1970s. First, the 1971 Bretton Woods Conference
enforced an upward adjustment in the value of the yen against the U.S.
dollar, from US$1= Y360 to US$1= Y306. The result was a 16.88 percent
jump in the value of the yen, the largest adjustment among the affected
currencies.s
All Japanese efforts to stop or limit the extent of re-evaluation
failed. Then Japanese Prime Minister Sato pronounced that this was the
.greatest economic shock for Japan since World War 11.6 This event had
a fantastic psychological impact on the Japanese.-Thousands protested on
the streets and many considered this a national economic crisis.
Although their fears appear to be vastly exaggerated, they were not
totally unreal. For one, it would seriously reduce Japanese
competitiveness in international markets. Japan had registered double-
digit economic growth throughout the 1950s and 1960s appreciation of
the yen reduced annual economic growth to a meager 7 to 8 percent,7 and
Japanese stock prices plunged.8 These incidents reinforced Japanese
fears that all these may trigger a recession, felt by many Japanese as
the worst possible threat to them and their country.
The next emergency was the OPEC Oil Embargo of 1973-74. The Oil
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Crisis greatly heightened Japanese awareness of their country's
vulnerability to any external changes, especially those in the economic
sphere. In the immediate post-oil crisis years, Japan experienced its
first recession in nearly thirty years.
By this time even the U.S. has become a major OPEC oil importer and
also battling with soaring oil prices and inflation. The world saw how
OPEC, a small group of oil-producing states, could bring a superpower
and other world economies to their knees simply by manipulating crude
prices or by cutting oil production. The Arab-Israeli War(1973), the
Iranian Revolution and the Iran-Iraq War were other ominous threats to
the supply of oil from the Middle East to Japan.
Then in 1974, a group of developing countries known as the "Group
of 77" put forward demands for a New International Economic Order at the
U.N. General Assembly. Two of these many demands that particularly
worried Japan were the stabilization and increase in the price of
primary commodities and reforms in the pricing of shipping services. If
implemented, these reforms would obviously hurt Japanese interests as
Japan is heavily dependent on imports of raw materials and owns the
largest merchant fleet in the world in tonnage terms.
On Japanese relations with the.ASEAN, the Japanese were shocked and
horrified by the violent anti-Japanese riots that greeted Prime
Minister Tanaka during his visit to the region in 1974.
On the domestic front, the Japanese were confronted with the high
environmental and human costs of industrialization. Pollution generated
by its industries was polluting the air, water and land, endangering its
meager domestic food production. Many innocents were tragically killed
or maimed for life in several inicidents involving contamination of
food, water or the environment by poisonous industrial wastes. The more
notorious were the pollution of farm and pasture lands by cadmium dumped
by the Nippon Mining Company's zinc refinery, and mercury poisoning in
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Minamata caused by mercury dumping by the Nippon Nitrogen Company which
claimed 46 lives.9
These industries, however dangerous they may be, produce goods that
are indispensable to many other Japanese industries. The only solution
was to move them- preferably overseas. The Ministry of International
Trade and Industry's(MITI) 1971 White Paper advocated a re-orientation
of the economy from `resource-proned' and 'resource-consuming'
industries toward `clean and knowledge-intensive' ones.10 The MITI's
Council on Industrial Structure further stressed that Japanese overseas
economic cooperation should be promoted from 1976 onward for the
relocation of heavy and petro-chemical plants in resource- and labor-
rich countries. Hence, the stability of foreign places where Japan
intends to transfer its industries to will also become vital to Japan's
national security.
In recent years, Japan's trade problems with the U.S. and Western
Europe and the rising tide of protectionist sentiment in these places
have strained Japan's relations with them and it becomes ever more
important for Japan to develop good relations with other states for the
purpose of economic exchange.
Such close interdependence in the economic and political dimensions
convinced Japanese leaders that Japan must adopt a new foreign policy
posture to deal with these international developments and to facilitate
the country's domestic changes. It was precisely these develpments that
laid the foundation for the Comprehensive National Security Strategy.
To Japan security then means not only defense of the islands from
foreign physical aggression but also the protection and strengthening of
many other national interests. It was clearly stated in the Japan
Defense White Paper of FY1981-82 that,
Japan is dependent for its life and prosperity on
imports of the bulk of its resources and energy.
Amonsz the possible threats to its safety and
12
existence are the restriction or suspension of
supplies of resources, energies, and foodstuffs,
etc., as well as armed aggression.12
A national priority is continuous economic development in a
relatively peaceful and stable global environment. Another is an
enlargement of Japan's world role arid status to enable Japan to use its
global economic leverage to its advantage in influencing and shaping
international financial and trade policies.
Japan had adhered to the Basic Policy for National Defense since
its introduction in 1957, along with the Japan-U.S. security agreements
and the non-nuclear policy adopted in 1968 to form the foundation for
the country's defense policy. Then in 1981 Ohira introduced the concept
of comprehensive security in the country's security strategy. The
concept was officially adopted by his successor Zenko Suzuki by
gradually incorporating it into every aspect of Japanese security. In
FY1981-82, Tokyo, for the first time ever, stressed that for Japan's
security the country should assume an international peace-keeping role
through cooperation with other countries. In the Defense White Paper of
FY1982-83, Tokyo emphasized three aspects necessary. to safeguard peace
and independence and maintain the country's security:
(1) Japan must strive to realize a peaceful
international climate, promoting solidarity and
cooperation with Western and other nations,
cooperate more positively in U.N. activities for
,maintenance of peace and security, global security
and economic development through diplomatic efforts
to resolve or alleviate disputes and confrontations
in various parts of the world and through economic
cooperation
(2) Japan must make self-help efforts to maintain
a defense capability adequate for detering
aggression and depending on itself in any invasion
that may occur and
(3) that the Japan-U.S. security arrangements
must be maintained and to ensure their smooth and
effective implementation.
In the FY1983-84 Defense White Paper, the term comprehensive
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security found its way into the Japanese diplomatic jargon:
For securing Japan's peace and security, policies
that are consistent with comprehensive security
considerations must be promoted in all areas of
respected fields including foreign affairs, the
economy and dPfPnca 14
Actually the concept of comprehensive security had already
established itself in Japanese policies in the mid-1970s. It was the
1973 OPEC Oil Embargo that painfully confirmed Japan's belief that its
economic progress is directly linked to its security. As it will be
discussed in greater detail at a later section, Japan immediately after
the Oil Crisis began to use its overseas investments and aid program to
secure resources crucial to Japan's economic well-being, i.e., its
national survival. The concept was only formally embraced in the 1980s
when it has grown to encompass all of Japan's security needs- economic,
political and military.
In this Comprehensive National Security Strategy, the military and
non-military aspects of security are interlocked so that strengthening
of one would also augment others. This approach to security is much
more pragmatic than mere military fortification since it takes into
account that military buildup is not an entirely viable or advisable
option to warrant the nation's political, economic and defense
interests.
First of all, there are both internal and external opposition to
JSDF expansion. Second, even if expansion were made, Japan will still
remain extremely vulnerable because of the demographic distribution of
its population. Tokyo and its three neighboring prefectures shelter 25
pecent of the national population Osaka and its three neighboring
prefectures, another 15 percent-15 With heavy population and industrial
concentration in the major cities, any attack on these parts would
surely incur irreparable damages on the transport and communication
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networks, crippling the entire economy. Third, in any superpower
military confrontation, Japan would become a natural target for -pre-
emptive strikes by the Soviets. These reasons explain why Comprehensive
National Security Strategy puts heavy emphasis on non-military
cooperation which includes economic cooperation in the forms of
technology transfer, trade, investment, aid, etc., and education,
cultural and atheletic exchanges, instead of a single-minded drive
toward militarization.
Tokyo reasons that it can increase global security by
redistributing its wealth. The Japanese are enlarging their involvement
in resolving the third world debt crisis through many unilateral actions
and cooperative efforts with foreign states and international agencies,
including the lowering of interest rates on existing loans and raising
its contributions to multilateral institutions.
This strategy also enables Japan to maximize the use of its
economic power at a time when non-military cooperation, particularly
economic cooperation, has become a major component of international
diplomacy and in fostering improved ties with the communist economies.
In the past few years, the political climate between the East and
the West has become more relaxed with diminishing emphasis on ideology
and armament on both sides. Japan is, thus, optimizing this opportunity
to enhance its global status and national security.
The following are the major national security interests that Tokyo
hopes to guarantee and advance with its Comprehensive National Security
Strategy, with special reference to the ASEAN region.
SLOCs and Crdue Oil
Japan's main security interest in Southeast Asia is the safety of
navigation through the SLOCs(Sea Lines of Communication) that cut
15
through the ASEAN region- the most important being the Malacca Straits
and the Lombok Straits. More than 70 percent of Japan's crude oil
imports pass through these straits16 40 percent of its total world
imports of all commodities goes through the ASEAN region.'? Any
disruption at these bottleneck routes would require re-routing around
Australia, increasing shipping distance by as much as 78 percent.18
The most hostile of potential threats to these navigation routes is
the Soviet Union. U.S.S.R. maintains permanent military establishments
in Danang and Cam Ranh Bay and frequently conducts naval exercises in
the South China Sea. The Soviet fleet is capable of intercepting these
choke points and even complete blockades of them. Soviet aggression and
expansion is thus most feared as interdiction at any point along these
routes would strangle Japan's economy.
Table 1. Map of Sea Routes
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Another possible threat would be contention for control of these
straits by the coastarl states of the ASEAN who sit astride these
crucial lifelines of Japan. Consequently, Japan's desire to cultivate
good will with the ASEAN states and among them, especially the littoral
states adjoining the Malacca and the Lombok Straits, is aimed at keeping
these passages safely open and minimize the risk of denial of passage
due to political reasons. The administration of these straits by
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friendly and stable governments is therefore indispensable to Japan's
security.
As Japan cannot and is reluctant to play a military role in
Southeast Asia, defense of these major sealanes depend heavily on the
ASEAN states. Japan thus hopes to build up the defense capability of
these countries by strengthening their economies through economic aid
and cooperation.
Oil is the single most important import for Japan. With no
significant petroleum endowment, Japan imports more crude oil than any
other country. It depends on oil for nearly 70 percent of its total
energy needs, far greater than any West European or north American
economy.19
Oil is so important to Japan that a Japanese official once remarked,
...there is no national security without oil. The Oil Crisis of 1973
forced the Japanese to confront the profound vulnerability of their
economy and their country. In FY1974-75, the economy recorded its first
negative growth rate since 1945. The country sank into a recession and
inflation rocketed. There was little the Japanese government could do
to avert or ameliorate the situation. Civilian oil consumption was
curtailed some military exercises were halted. With less than a 45-day
oil inventory in the country, Japan abandoned its neutralism for a pro-
Arab stance(even at the risk of aritagoninzing the pro-Israel U.S.) to
protect its national interest of obtaining that precious commodity-
oil, from the Arab-dominated OPEC.20
In response to the OPEC oil embargoes of the 1970s and turbulences
in the Middle East, Tokyo took steps to ease the country's dependence on
oil, especially OPEC oil from the Middle East, by diversifying its
energy sources and their places of origin.
Japan has been developing the use of nuclear and hydroelectric
power, utilizing natural gas or Liquefied Natural Gas(LNG) and coal,
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absorbing nearly all of the ASEAN's oil and LNG exports and buying crude
from China(thereby offsetting increments that would otherwise be
supplied by the OPEC), and participating in overseas energy resource
exploration and development.21 Conservation is encouraged even when
crude prices are low. Oil and LNG stock-piles are rising, now reaching
about 100 days(up from just 30 to 35 days before the 1973 Oil Crisis)
and 45 days, respectively.
Table 2. Structure of Japan's Energy Sources
NuclearHydroNatural













Note: In the year 2000 the remaining 6 percent is expected to come
from geothermal and other non-oil energy sources.
Source: Compiled from Energy 1987 (May 1987), pp. 220-223.
The ASEAN countries with the exception of Singapore hold
substantial reserves of oil and LNG. (However, Singapore is the world's
third largest oil refinery center.22 It refines one million barrels of
oil every day, of which 70 to 80 percent goes to Japan.23) Although
currently less than 20 percent of Japan's crude oil comes from Southeast
Asia, the percentage of it has been growing steadily.24
The oil shocks have sped up Japan's indigenous and overseas oil
development efforts. Southeast Asia has become a major focus for oil
and LNG exploration by the Japanese as the presence of these resources
is alredy determined. Favoable geological potential and low-sulphur
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content of most Southeast Asian crude and proximity of the Japanese
market have brought huge amounts of capital and technology into the
region for energy resource development over the past decade.25
Securing Raw Materials
Among the major industrialized economies, Japan is surely the most
destitute in natural resources. With a population of 121.5 million
within an area of only 378,000sq.km.(compared with the U.S. population
of 241.6 million but in an area twenty-four times the size of Japan26).
Japan's dependence on food imports is the highest among OECD
countries.27
Table 3. Dependence on Imports of Foodstuffs
Among OECD Countries
Amount Percentage of











Source: OECD,Statistics of Foreign Trade(1986)
Japan is totally dependent on imports of many commodities, e.g.,
petroleum, cotton, wool, aluminum, nickel, uranium, and phsophoric ore.
Dependence on other minerals including cooking coal, iron ore, copper,
chromium, tin and'manganese is over 95 percent.28
As these figures would indicate, Japan even with its super-high
technology and advanced industrial infrastructure, will not be able to
survive or produce anything without its imports of foodstuffs, raw
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materials and energy resources.
The ASEAN economies, by contrast, are rich in natural resources.
As these countries are geographically close to Japan and lie astride
major sealines of communication, they serve to meet many of Japan's
resource needs.
Nearly 99 percent of Japan's total natural rubber imports comes
from Thailand(69.3 percent), Malaysia(17.4 percent) and Indonesia(10.2
percent). Ninety-five percent of the country's tropical lumber imports
is supplied by the ASEAN countries. The region also fulfill substantial
Japanese requirements of other commodities including zinc, bauxite,
copper, nickel, vegetable oil, and other foodstuffs.29
Among the six ASEAN countries, Brunei, Indonesia and Malaysia are
of special importance to Japan because of their substantial reserves of
oil, natural gas and other minerals.
To secure a stable supply of raw materials from the ASEAN and to
increase them to meet rising Japanese demands, Japan has been making
heavy investments in developong and gaining control of these resources
in the region. As a matter of fact, most Japanese government and
private loans, economic and technical aid and other forms of economic
cooperation with the region are generally related to resource
development projects.
Trade and Markets
Over the past decade, particularly in the past five to six years,
Japan has been experiencing much hardship in promoting its exports in
the lucrative north American and European markets. One major factor is
rising protectionism in these places because of their gargantuous trade
deficits with Japan. Another is the spectacular rise of the yen against
the U.S. dollar since 1985. The situation is worsened by floods of
similar goods at much lower proces from the NICs, specifically Korea and
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Taiwan. They have further undermined Japan's competitiveness by seizing
sizable chunks of the U.S. and European electronic, home appliance, and
computer parts and hardware markets.
Although a great proportion of Japan's products is consumed
domestically, Japan has to export to earn the dollars it needs to
purchase oil and other imports. Preparing itself for these changes in
the industrialized economies of the West, Japan has been developing
new trade partners. Huge investments, loans, and assistance have been
directed to the developing countries of Asia, the hopefuls in contrast
against those hopeless bread-baskets of Africa. Through these
efforts, Japan hopes to see more vibrant and wealthy economies that will
be able to absorb more Japanese consumption and industrial goods, and so
far results have been very encouraging. This is especially true in the
case of the ASEAN which is one of the fastest growing regions in the
world.
The ASEAN community is the third largest trading partner of Japan
after the U.S. and the European Economic Community. It accounts for 8.5
percent of Japan's international trade in 1985.30
Simultaneously, Japan is the single largest trading partner of the
ASEAN, purchasing nearly a quarter of the region's total exports, while
Japanese goods make up a fifth of all of the region's imports.31
In 1985 Japanese imports from the ASEAN were almost $20 billion or
15 percent of the county's total imports. At the same time, exports to
the ASEAN were nearly $15 billion or 10 percent of all Japanese
exports.32
Japan sustains a balance of trade(BOP) deficit in trade with the
ASEAN. For instance in 1986, the surplus enjoyed by the ASEAN was $4390
million. However, this can be misleading for in reality only Indonesia
and Malaysia have surpluses in bilateral trade with Japan. This is
larely because of Japan's oil and LNG imports from them. Deficits are
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suffered by the other ASEAN countries whose exports to Japan are either
less price competitive or less demanded by the Japanese market.
Table 4. Japan-ASEAN Trade. 1985
total ASEAN exports total ASEAN imports
to Japan(US$mil,%) from Japan(US$ mil,%)
Indonesia 9,007 (49.1) 2,619 (28.1)
Malaysia 3,784 (24.6) 2,833 (23.0)
Philippines 875 (19.0) 750 (14.0)
Singapore 2,184( 9.4) 4,486 (16.3)
Thailand 951 (13.3) 2,448 (26.0)
ASEAN total 13,135 20.6)16,801 (24.4)
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics (Yearbook 1986)
Japan-ASEAN trade assumes the typical asymmetrical pattern of trade
between developed and developing countries. Some 90 percent of Japan's
imports from the ASEAN is primary products(processed and unprocessed)
and energy manufactures make up less than 10 percent of total exports
to Japan.33 On the contrary, Japanese exports to the ASEAN are almost
entirely dominated by industrial plants and equipments, electronic
instruments, and other manufactured consumer goods.
On the transfer of capital, over half of Japan' aggregate overseas
direct investments from 1951 to 1986 in Asia has been injected into the
ASEAN economies. This represents 13.6 percent of Japan's direct foreign
investments within the period.
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Table 5. Japan's Overseas Direct Investments
1985 1986 Net 1951-1986
Region Value Value value
North
America 5,495 45.0 10,441 46.8 37,406 35.3
(U.S.A.) (5,395)(44.2) (10,615)(45.5) (35,455) (33.5)
Europe 1,930 15.8 3,469 15.5 14.471 13.7
Asia 1,435 11.7 2,427 10.4 21,790 20.6
(ASEAN) (948)( 7.7) (866) (3.9) (14,427) (13.6)
Middle
East 45 0.4 44 0.2 3,016 2.8
Africa 172 1.4 309 1.4 3,678 3.5
Oceania 525 4.3 992 4.4 5,234 4.9
12.217 100.0Total 22,320 100.0 105,970 100.0
Source: MTTT and Ministrv of Finance, Japan
Nearly half of all Japanese investments in the region is in mining.
Within the manufacturing sector, production of metal products and
textiles and clothing take up 13 and 8.6 percent of total Japanese
investments in the ASEAN34, investments in other manufacturing areas are
extremely small.
Because of geographic or economic considerations, Asia is and will
continue to be Japan's natural and most important trading partner in the
coming decades. Japan's economic success in the 21st century will
greatly depend on its close relationship with the economies of Asia,
especially with developments like protectionism in the U.S. and European
markets, EC integration in 1992, and the growing prosperity of the Asian
economies, and Japan's domestic and foreign policy changes.
JSDF Fortification
For years Japan had been reluctant to involve itself in its domestic
defense or in an regional and international security efforts that
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expected military alliances or deployment of the JSDF. Countries in
Asia and the West did not want a vigorous Japanese defense force either.
So in the three decades since 1945, Japan was essentially dependent
on the U.S. nuclear umbrella and U.S. troops stationed in Japan for the
nation's defense.
During the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s, growing lack of
confidence among the Japanese population in the U.S. defense shield and
U.S. credibility in its security commitments to Japan induced the
Japanese government to formulate more self-reliant defense policies and
to augment JSDF capabilities.
Although the majority of Japanese feels that Japan's national
defense should be achieved through a combination of diplomacy, economic
power, military might, and other means a growing consensus for a
strengthening of the JSDF in correspondence to the changes in the
international environment is emerging. The new generation of Japanese
is more sensitive to external changes. They still look on to America as
a close Japanese ally but there are serious doubts of the U.S.
commitment to defend Japan at all costs. The Japanese population is now
advocating more positive and independent security and defense policies
and is more aware of the pragmatic need to maintain the JSDF. A 1982
nationwide poll on defense conducted by the Prime Minister's office
revealed that 86 percent of Japanese endorsed the JSDF and 69 percent of
them identified the maintenance of national security as the primary
reason for supporting the JSDF.
Japan's defense capabilities have been significantly increased under
the various defense plans adopted since the late 1960s. And throughout
the 1980s, Japan has continued to expand the JSDF's capabilities in
spite of the peaceful international atmosphere and the greater degree of
openness of and cooperation with the communist bloc. There are clear
signs that Japan is determined to continue this buildup of the JSDF and
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to raise the prominence of the JSDF in Asia.
The land and air forces of the JSDF operate strictly within Japanese
territory. They have the duty of defending the country and its
population from direct foreign hostility on Japanese soil.
Although the Chinese are no longer viewed as a, threat to the
country, the Soviets are still dealt with great caution. If a
conventional Soviet attack is launched against Japan, these two forces
cannot hold off the far superior Soviet forces for more than a month.
Direct U.S. military assistance must be summoned for the nation's
survival.
The maritime branch of the JSDF, the Maritime Self-Defense
Force(MSDF), fares no better when compared to the Soviet naval force but
it can more effectively discourage Soviet interference and interdiction
activities in the Japan Sea (and straits between the major Japanese
islands in which the Soviet navy frequently intrudes into) to keep these
waterways free and safe for navigation. Outside the Northeast Asian
region, Tokyo is most concerned with the Strait of Hormuz in the Middle
East and the SLOCs in the ASEAN. There isn't much the MSDF can do in
the Middle East but Tokyo is interested in keeping the latter free from
Soviet intimidation, particularly when Soviet naval forces are only a
few hundred miles away in the ports of Vietnam and Cambodia and
frequently exercise in the South Cccccchina Sea.
Consequently, Tokyo wants to expand the MSDF's perimeter of patrol
to 1000 nautical miles from Japan, bringing the MSDF into the
territorial waters of the ASEAN states.
Among the ASEAN states, the Philippines and Indonesia have been the
most vociferous critics of the JSDF. There were concerns for Japanese
rearmament and that the national sovereignty of the ASEAN states in
these waters and maybe even in the coastal areas could be undermined by
Japanese military presence. From the legal perspective, some contended
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that this would be a violation of Japan's constitution- that the
presence of a "defense force" in a foreign territory could no longer be
considered as purely "defensive" in nature. Another concern of the
ASEAN states is that expansion of MSDF capabilities will invite the
Soviets to expand their military presence in the region as Moscow may
perceive a weakening of U.S. commitment to the region's defense.
Furthermore, the ASEAN states are troubled by the fact that Japan
now has the third largest deense budget in the world after the two
superpowers. Yet this still represents less than two percent of its GNP
compared to some 6.4 percent of the GNP for the U.S. and 5.1 percent of
the GNP for U.K.37 Just two years ago, Tokyo broke the "1% of GNP"
ceiling on defense and the ratio is still rising. There were also
incidents like former Prime Minister Nakasone's visit to the Yasukuni
Shrine for the war dead and the controversy over the revision of
Japanese history texts. Another is the recent dispute between Japan and
the U.S. over joint manufacture of the FSX, an advance model of the F16.
Since it would involve the transfer of valuable aerospace technology to
Japan, many defense and economic experts warn the possible boomerang
effect on the West as Japan may destroy the West's competitive edge in
the production of commercial and military aircrafts. All these add to
consolidate the ASEAN's anxiety over revival of Japanese militarism.
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Table 6. Japan's Defense Expenditure
(in billion ven)
Ratio to
Defense Growth from Ratio Total Gov't
Year Budget Previous Yea to GNP Budget
1955 134.9 3.3 1.78 13.6
1960 156.9 0.6 1.23 9.9
1965 301.4 9.6 1.07 8.24
1970 569.5 17.7 0.79 7.16
1975 1,327.3 21.4 0.84 6.23
1976 1,512.4 13.9 0.90 6.22
1977 1,690.6 11.8 0.88 5.93
1980 2,230.2 6.5 0.90 5.24
1984 2,934.6 6.5 0.99 5.80
1986 3,343.5 6.58 0.993 6.18
1987 3,517.4 5.2 1.004 6.5
1988 3,700.3 5.2 1.013 6.53
Source: Figures for 1955 to 1976 are from Defense
Agency of Japan, Defense of Japan 1977 while
remaining figures are compiled from various
sources.
The likelihood of an all-out Japanese military buildup is really
quite remote. First, there is domestic opposition. Second, foreign
states may demonstrate their objection by halting or sharply reducing
trade with Japan. In the end, Japan's national security is harmed
rather than enhanced.
Japan is trapped in a predicament. On one hand, the ASEAN objects to
JSDF expansion on the other, there is overwhelming U.S. pressure for
greater JSDF commitment and complaints that Japan is getting a free
ride in its defense.
As an economic superpower fighting for acceptance in the exclusive
club of Western developed countries, Japan will have to assume
international peace-keeping and development responsibilities befitting a
mjor political and economic power. Therefore, it is crucial for Japan
to obtain the endorsement or at least the acquisence of the ASEAN for
the fortification of the JSDF, the first step toward enhancing Japan's
politico-military role in the Asia-Pacific region. For instance
27
Nakasone's 1983 visit to the ASEAN with promises of small yen credits
and technical cooperation had effectively tuned:down the Philippines and
Indonesia's adamant opposition to Japan's defense policy, specifically
on the 1000-nautical mile limit policy.38
International Status Enhancement
Traditionally japan has avoided any direct entanglement in any
political conflict in Asia and elsewhere. JSDF troops were kept from
participating in military peace-keeping activities overseas by legal
restraints, but Tokyo had also been most reluctant to act as mediator in
any political or military strifes. For example, Japan has kept to a
minimum its involvement in the Indochinese refugee problem. The country
has accepted very few Indochinese refugee, and so far less than a
hundred were granted Japanese citizenship. Its only substantial
contribution was economic aid to organizations responsible for the care
and relocation of refugees.39 Sizable sums were also given to the ASAN
staes who receive the majority of Indochinese refugee.40
To put it bluntly, it was a policy of minimal involvement in
problems that do not directly impinge on Japanese security to prevent
itself from being drawn into ideological or politico-military alliances
in order to maximize the economic advantages in its relationships with
foreign states. Participation was only to an extent necessary to avoid
isolation. With its financial wealth, the country simply pays others to
assume its global responsibilities.
Japan is gradually coming to terms with internationalization,
accepting that its existence as a member of the world community demands
greater involvement in world economic, as well as political affairs.
Japan is no longer satisfied with being an economic superpower. It seeks
an international political role that is commensurate with its financial
strength.
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For years, Japan's foreign policies were only designed to advance
the country's economic progress. The absence of any solid ideological
commitment or vision befitting a world power in Japanese policies was
the major reason why many countries would not take Japan seriously as a
global political leader even if it is a world economic power. For
instance, India has a much smaller economy but its independent stands on
many international issues and its ideological convictions of socialism
and independence of developing countries from domination and
exploitation by foreign powers, especially the superpowers, have enabled
India to present itself as a leader of the third world, such as in the
Non-Aligned Movement, and establish itself as a formidable political
entity in many multilateral organizations and international conferences.
The Comprehensive National Security Strategy was thus introduced to
remedy this situation. Japan began to advocate global cooperation for
world peace and stability as its ideology to support and rationalize its
foreign policies and gradually expand the country's international
status.
During his first official state visit to the U.S., Takeshita pledged
to increase Japan's contributions to the developing countries.41 After
the June 1988 Toronto Summit, Takeshita spoke in Chicago and promised
Japan's cooperation in "helping to resolve and prevent conclicts"
between nations and proposed the creation of an "international furusato"
(a global village) as the ultimate goal of global cooperation.42
This pursuit for international status really began not in the 1980s
but in the 1960s under the Sato administration.43 It was only in the
1980s that the world witnessed a Japan that is fervently broadening its
influence in all areas as part of its Comprehensive National Security
Strategy.
Japan hopes that greater involvement in international affairs would
win her support from other countries for the realization of its national
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goals for the 1980s and 1990s: first, Japan desires global status of a
level that is on par with the Western powers second, greater leverage,
both economic and political, in the international enivronment would
facilitate Japan's development needs.
In 1978 Japan demanded a permanent chair in the U.N. Security
Council, that symbol of status that would put Japan in the league of
countries like the U.S., the Soviet Union, U.K., France and China. This
request was rejected since Japan has failed to find support even from
its Asian neighbors. The ASEAN countries all supported an unlikely and
obviously much inferior contender- Bangladesh.44 The same
disappointment greeted Japan in its 1981 bid to have the 1988 Summer
Olympics staged in Nagoya.
These setbacks have spurred Japan to make greater efforts to enlarge
its role in many international issues and organizations with its
economic muscles. In March 1989, Japanese Finance Minister Tetsuo
Murayama pledged financial support for the new U.S. plan to help reduce
the Third World debt, including a lowering of interest rates on exisitng
loans.45 In international lending agencies like the World Bank, the
IMF, and the ADB, Japan has increased its influence by purchasing large
subscriptions.
Every major power has its sphere of influence. If Japan is to get
itself recognized as a formidable political power, it must then
establish for itself a sphere if influence. The European Community will
become one large, open market in 1992. Japan also envisions a sort of
"Common Asian Market" in which Japan occupies a leadership position in
its development.
Japan is the strongest economy in Asia and all Asian countries are
eager to forge closer trade relations with Japan for their domestic
development. We can already see greater cooperation among the Asian
economies and between them and Japan. Japan has been very generous in
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extending to them financial grants and loans. In return Japan has
secured a stronger voice in many regional organizations, most clearly in
the case of the ASEAN. In the Third ASEAN Summit in December 1987,
Japan was the only dialogue partner invited to attend the summit
conference in Manila.
Another sign of Japan's greater political role in Asian affairs is
its new position on the Kampuchean question. Japan has offered to
mediate for a Vietnamese withdrawal from Kampuchea.46 Although the
recent decision to pull out the Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea was
made solely by Hanoi, offers of badly needed economic assistance from
Japan had surely affected Hanoi's decision to some extent. In 1984,
Foreign Minister Shintaro Abe announced that (1) Japan would consider
financing an international peace-keeping force in Kampuchea (2) offered
official personnel assistance and facilities in monitoring any
forthcoming election in the country; and (3) promised Japanese aid after
peace is established.47
Outside the Asian region, Japan has also made significant diplomatic
initiatives. Foreign Minister Sosuke Uno visited Israel in June 1988. He
was the first Japanese Cabinet Minister to visit the Jewish state. The
trip demonstrated a sharp departure from Japan's past policy of
appeasement with the Arab states.48 On the Afghan issue, Tokyo has
plans to.dispatch civilians to join the U.S. peace-keeping operation in
the country, the first of its kind undertaken by the Japanese. Five
million dollars was pledged to finance U.N. peace efforts in Afghanistan
and Japanese workers were sent there to assist in transporting refugees
and rebuilding the. telecommunications network damaged by the decade-long
war.49 On the audacious SDI program of the U.S., Japan announced its
participation in research and development in 1986. In the same year,
Japan concluded a technology-sharing agreement with Washington which
stipulated the supply of dual-use technology to the U.S.
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Within the. U.N., Japan has also made significant headway. A
Japanese national now chairs the World Health Organization and Japan
finances nearly eleven percent of the U.N. annual budget, a contribution
that is second only to the U.S.'s.50 In international relief efforts,
Japan has broadened its capacity to respond to large-scale disasters.
In the 1985 Mexican earthquake and Colombian volcanic eruption, Japan
donated $1.25 million to each country, plus emergency funding and sent
its disaster-relief medical team to help the disaster victims. In April
1986, Japan set 'up a special organization to respond to natural
disasters- the International Emergency Relief System.51
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CHAPTER III
JAPAN'S ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO AND
COOPERATION WITH THE ASEAN
Over the years, the ASEAN has slowly but surely achieved greater
unity in promoting closer intra-regional cooperation and in advancing
the interests of its members.
The stability and growing affluence of the region has given rise to
stronger nationalism among the ASEAN population, each becoming more
independent in security matters. On a regional basis, the members are
seeking greater cooperation, e.g., Singapore has helped trained some
Bruneian troops. While in their alliance with the U.S., the ASEAN states
wants greater equity. The Philippine government had successfully
bargained for higher rents and shortened the leases of the U.S.
miliatary bases in the islands.
This noble impulse to become self-reliant in the region's defense
is, however, extremely difficult to realize since these developing
states have only limited resources. Simultaneously these resources are
already being competed for by economic and social demands. Diversion of
these scarce resources to the military sector would severely strain on-
going economic development and dash hopes for improving life for the
majority of the ASEAN population.
Intra-regional commercial exchange is small as their economies
produce similar products. There is little that they can offer to each
other in terms of capital and technology. Hence, the ASEAN states
cannot effectively develop without outside help.
Japan and the ASEAN have highly complimentary economies. The ASEAN
countries are rich in resources, including minerals, energy,
agricultural and fisheries produce, and labor. Japan, on the other hand,
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is in a position to offer capital and technology.
Japan has much to gain in facilitating the development of the ASEAN
states. First, Japan would have greater assurance for raw materials and
energy sources from the ASEAN. Participation in the development of
these resources would further guarantee this. Second, industrialization
would require the ASEAN economies to import capital and industrial
equipments and technology from Japan. Third, the growing market
potential of these economies would certainly increase the demand for
consumer goods, e.g., electrical appliances and automobiles. Fourth,
Japanese assistance in the ASEAN's development would clearly benefit the
ASEAN states but at the same time it would facilitate Japan's own
economic restructuring, transferring the labor- and resource-intensive
and space-consuming industries to the ASEAN. Fifth, stronger ASEAN
economies could produce stronger ASEAN military forces in safeguarding
the freedom of the Malacca Straits and other sealines. Sixth, goodwill
and gratitude from the ASEAN states could possibly win their support for
Japan in many international issues, building up Japan's global political
power and prestige. For example, Japan's chances of acquiring a
permanent seat in the U.N. Security Council may improve significantly
with the endorsement of the ASEAN and other develping,countries which
Japan is also actively assisting in their development. Seventh, economic
prosperity can contribute to the stability of the region. It would
protect Japan's vested economic and political stakes in the region by
allaying feelings of discontent and frustration felt by peoples unable
to develop as rapidly as they would like to. Such feelings compounded
by poverty breeds totalitarianism and communism. Finally, it would
improve Japan's image, relieving it of some of the international
criticisms that Japan is not contributing enough to international peace,
development and security.
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The motives and direction of Japanese economic aid and cooperation
are therefore intimately linked to Japan's national security needs.
Assistance to promote another country's development or global peace and
stability should directly or indirectly advance the nation's security
interests. Simultaneously, its perceived security threats and
requirements are affected by politico-economic developments in the
domestic and international environments.
In a more general sense, aid may be defined as the explicit
transfer of real resources to less developed countries on concessional
terms of a variety of origins, commercial or official. Narrowing it
only to official assistance, it may be defined as government-sponsored
flows of resources made available on concessional terms to foreign
governments. Whichever way one wishes to define it, foreign aid is
basically a movement of resources from one country to another designed
to assist the latter in its development. Furthermore, cooperation may
include private investments and other profit or non-profit endeavors.
Thus, economic assistance and cooperation may come in many forms,
including government and private loans, financial and commodity grants,
personnel development, investment, etc.
The transfer of science and technology is also an important element
of aid and cooperation as skills and know-how would facilitate a
country's development. It is, however, more complex than other forms of
assistance because what is transfered is most often intangible, and
there are simply no laws governing the precise nature of technical
transfer. It may be transfered through personnel training and
education, licensing of production technology, plans, models, foreign
direct investments bringing personnel, management skills, production
know-how, tools and machineris, etc. The success and effectiveness of
such transfers can be assessed and evaluated only by judging the
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adaptability and appropriateness of such skills and knowledge to the
domestic environment of the recipient countries.
The Japanese government views all forms of government grants, loans
and credits as economic aid. Often in the calculation of it, private
efforts, e.g. private loans, grants and business investments are
included as well. As such, Japan's ODA2 includes bilateral and
multilateral grants(financial, commodity and technical), as well as
government loans.3
The following sections will chart the development of Japan's
assistance to and cooperation with the ASEAN since the 1950s when Japan
first began to use these economic tools in expanding diplomatic
relations with foreign states. This will reflect the changes in Tokyo's
perception of its security needs and how Tokyo had tried to promote them
through economic cooperation.
The 1950s: A Fresh Start
Japan's aid programs began modestly with its war reparations program
in 1951.4 A total of $1152.8 million in damages and $737.5 million in
loans were disbursed to the Southeast Asian states and Burma.5 However,
scrutiny of the composition and terms of the reparations reveals that
they could have benefitted Japan more than they did to the recipient.
In the case of the Philippines who received the lion's share of the
payments, out of the total $780 million received only $30 million was in
cash for war widows and orphans. Five hundred million dollars were
goods grants and the rest was relatively low-interest commercial loans
over a period of twenty years. Indonesia received $223 million over a
12-year period and commerical loans of up to $400 million. Thailand
received a tital of $41.7 million worth of shipping vessels and captial
goods, while Singapore was alloted $17 million in grants and loans.6
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As the larger part of the indemnity was dominated by commodity and
service grants, Japan was actually developing markets for its exports.
This growing influx of Japanese commercial and capital goods, financial
institutions and styles formed the basis for future dependence on Japan.
Japan's initial investments during this period concentrated in
resource development, especially mining in Indonesia and the
Philippines.?
Motivated by desires to open more markets for its exports, Japan
continue to expand its diplomatic ties and influence in the region.
Japan joined the Colombo Plan in 1954 which was designed for cooperation
in economic development in South and Southeast Asia. This was the first
time in which Japan extended official assistance, and not indemnity, to
developing countries.8 Japan also took part in another program of
similar nature organized by the United Nations- the U.N. Expanded
Program of Technical Assistance. In both plans, technology transfer was
the main focus.
As a matter of fact, technical assistance was an early and important
form of Japanese aid that was wholly financed, by the Japanese
government. Although its technical aid was small in dollar terms and
offered a lower level of technology compared to those of the advanced
countries, the technolgy transfered had a significant impact on the
ASEAN economies since the level and types of technology transfered were
appropriate for these newly developing countries. Many from the
participating developing countries were either sent to Japan for
training or were trained by Japanese experts sent to their country-9
Japan took full advantage of these programs to promote its
industrial plants and equipments, which helps to explain Japan's
enthusiasm in these projects. The country also attended the Bandung
Conference in 1955 to establish ties with participants of this landmark
37
third world meeting.
In sum, aid during this period was aimed at opening up and improving
trade and political links with post-war Asia and to increase Japan's
diplomatic visibility in the region as Japan was regaining self-rule
from the Allied Occupation Forces. It was also used to improve Japan's
image among these Southeast Asian states, hoping to amend their
differences and erase their memories of Japanese atrocities during the
war. But most important of all, it was the first step towards Japan's
economic future.
1960 to 1968: Striving for Recognition and Status
By the late 1950s, Japan was already eager to establish itself as a
certified developed country. Because of this, it took on a new approach
to dispensing aid and cooperation, contructing a more comprehensive aid
program and expanding its forms and amount.
Japan helped found and joined the Development Assistance
Committee(DAC) of the OECD in 1960.10 Its involvement in international
economic agencies was illustrated by its active participation in the
GATT and ASPAC, and its decision to host the Asian Productivity
Council.11
In international financial agencies, Japan made its debut and
exercised its influence by taking large capital subscriptions in them,
e.g., in the International Development Association.12 In 1966, Japan
helped launched the Asian Development Bank and has become a dominating
force in it since because of its huge capital subscription holdings.13
Of the ADB's inital capital of $1100 million, $200 million of it was put
up by the Japanese(the second largest contribution after the U.S.).
Japan also gave $20 million to the ADB's Special Fund- generally used
for technology development projects- and $23 million to the Agriculture
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Fund. Moreover, $80 million of the Bank's $125.8 million Multipurpose
Fund was from Japan.14 Substantial contributions were also made to
various U.N. agencies and other international institutions,15
On the administrative side of aid disbursement, there was no
specific agency responsible for this task within the Japanese
bureaucracy in the 1950s. Each ministry simply drew up its own set of
priorities into which economic cooperation was incorporated. The top
priority in almost every ministry- and the nation as a whole- was
Japan's economic prosperity. Consequently, the resulting policies often
lacked coordination, efficiency and frequently only catered to the needs
of Japan, failing to satisfy the demands of the recipient countries. To
remedy the situation, the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund(OECF),
under the direction of the Economic Planning Agency, was set up in 1962
to administer and oversee special development project loans to
developing countries.
By 1966, Japan's aid program has begun to gain greater international
credibility. Japan agreed to upgrade its performace at the UNCTAD II
conference in 1968. To meet the OECD level of the Western developed
states, Japan promised to raise its ODA to 0.7 percent of GNP by 1970.16
Concurrently, Japan launched its new High-profile Southeast Asian
policy with three specific events in 1966: (1) Japan hosted the first
Ministerial Conference on Southeast Asian Economic Development (2) set
up the ADB and (3) created an Agricultural Fund for Southeast Asia.17
Japanese aid to the Southeast Asian region from 1960 to 1968
constituted twenty-eight percent of all Japanese aid and half of all
Japanese assistance to Asia in the same period-18
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Table 7. Japanese Aid By Area 1960-1968
(in U.S.$ million)
Southeas- Middle Int'l
total ASIA As is East Africa Agencies
960- 4753.5 2664.1 1318.0 325.5 650.5 334.7
1968 (56%) (28%) (7%) (14%) (7%)
Source: Chosa Geppo(Research Monthly), published by the
Cabinet Research Office, vol. 14, no. 12(December
1969), D. 14.
. From 1963 to 1970, Japanese aid to the non-communist countries of
the Asian region increased six-fold.19 The war in Vietnam raised
Japan's consciousness over its security, and the need for closer
cooperation with the free Southeast Asian states, who are nearest to
Indochina and themselves battling with domestic communist insurgencies,
to combat and curb the spread of communism.
The main feature of Japanese aid during this period was that a
disproportionate majority of it was bilateral grants with low
concessionality and government and private loans. Bilateral assistance
was preferred because it allows the donor greater control over the terms
of cooperation. This arrangement ensures that the donor, too, would
derive benefits from the donations, e.g., the aid-recipient country may
be required or recommended to make purchases from the donor country.
During the Ikeda years(1961-64), over 90 percent of Japan's aid was
bilateral. This helped Japan in balancing its B.O.P. and in financing
its imports.
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Table 8. Japanese Aid During the Ikeda Cabinet, 1961-64
(in million of U.S. dollars)
OFFICIAL FUNDS
1961 1962 1963 1964
Bilateral Grants
Reparations 65.1 66.8 62.1 57.8
Technical Aid 2.4 3.6 4.5 5.8
Other Grants 0.3 4.2 10.1 5.1
Gov't long-term capital
Direct Loand 26.8 12.5 60.3 49.1Others
-7.5
-8.8 -11.60.9
Grants to Multilateral Agencies 2.0 2.2 2.9 3.2
Capital Subscriptions to
Multilateral Agencies 9.4 5.0 9.2 6.5
SUBTOTAL 106.9 86.8 140.3 115.9
Private Funds
Foreign Direct Investment 98.4 68.4 76.7 39.3
Export Credits 180.7 130.3 50.6 135.7
Multilateral Portfolio
-4.6Investment 0.7 0.3
SUBTOTAL 274.5 199.4 127.3 175.3
TOTAL 381.4 286.2 267.6 291.2
National Income(in bil.US$) 41.32 46.68 52.93 60.08
Percent of National Income 0.92 0'. 61 0.51 0.48
Source: Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Japanese official assistance was strongly biased toward exports
promotion and excessively tied. Until 1969, about half of its total
transfer of resources to the developing countries was in the form of
deferred-payment export credits.
Grants to multilateral agencies was less than three percent of its
total aid, making it apparent that Japan wants participation in these
institutions for diplomatic reasons rather than providing real aid on a
equitable basis to developing countries. (Japan's ODA as percentage of
its GNP was consistently the lowest within the OECD).
Investments were strongly inclined toward developing resources and
infrastructures strategic to Japanese economic interests, although more
was drifting into the manufacturing and tertiary sectors.19
Japanese loans have much higher interest rates, ranging from 4.75 to
5.75 percent compared with capitalist Europe average of three percent.20
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Under equipment supply schemes, Japan furnished equipments and
machineries necessary for technology transfer. Japanese technical
assistance experts were dispatched to the ASEAN countries to teach and
demonstrate techniques. For effective implementation of this form of
technology transfer, the Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteers agencies
were established in 1965. Throughout this period, the ASEAN received
the largest number of Japanese technical experts sent overseas. For
instance in 1962, 62.5 percent of the total was sent to the ASEAN.
Foreign students were also trained in Japan in Japanese government-
financed programs, with ASEAN nationals representing some 60 percent of
all foreign trainees. Nonetheless, these training programs were not very
successful and limited to a restricted scale because of language
problems for most foreign students.21
Therefore, Japan's regional aid and economic cooperation efforts
were single-mindedly geared toward advancement of Japanese economic
interests, usually neglecting the socio-economic needs for balanced
development in the recipient country. Enlargement of Japan's regional
standing and influence was only to affairm its status as a developed
state and politico-military alliances were avoided, only pursuing broad
international political objectives immediately pertinent to Japan's
domestic economic progress.
1969 to 1977: Survival and Adjustment
Political maneouvers in the late 1960s and early 1970s aggravated by
the shock of the 1973 Oil Crisis brought about a decisive change in
Japan's economic aid arid cooperation policies. It was a crude awakening
of the Japanese psyche in accepting Japan's vulnerability and then
immediately and hastily trying to cope with these changes. The outcome
was the employment of resource diplomacy. The Japanese Foreign Ministry
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openly stated that economic cooperation and assistance were to be
concentrated in the resource-rich countries and countries along the
major maritime passageways to harness resources vital to Japan's economy
and ensure their safe transport to Japan. Almost all aid and
cooperation were geared for energy development. Japanese aid and
overseas investments rose rapidly. Amicable ties with countries holding
essential materials were considered necessary to assure stable supply of
these resources. For instance, Japanese ODS to the Middle East leaped
from a minute 0.1 percent of total Japanese aid(before the Oil Crisis)
to 12.4 percent of all Japanese aid in 1977.22
Japanese aid grew over 400 percent from $1263.1 million in 1969 to
$5884.4 million in 1973. The ODA component was about 25 percent of its
total assistance, accounting for $435.6 million and $1011 million in
1969 and 1973, respectively.23 By 1971, Japan had risen to become the
second largest aid donor within the DAC after the U.S.
Table 9. Aid from Major Donors Among OECD Countries
(in million of U.S. dollars)
Country 19701963 1965 1967
4,579United States 5,520 5,567 5,971
320Japan 601 855 1,824
1,242 1,299France 1,344 1,808
605 726F.R.G. 1,140 1,487
720 1,028U.K. 875 1,259
266321 285Italy 725
Source: OECD,Development Assistance, 1971 Review,
table 2, p. 144.
The recession caused by the 1973 Oil Crisis stagnated growth in
Japan's aid programs. Total aid from 1973 to 1975 fell, but shot up to
twice the 1973 level by 1978. Between 1976 and 1978, Japan's ODA
doubled.24 Bilateral and tied aid dominated Japanese assistance in the
1950s and 1960s so at the UNCTAD III in 1972, Japan promised to untie
its multi-lateral contributions. However, the recession from 1973 to
1975 impeded the process and it was only in 1975 that Japan began
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untying its bilateral aid and loans.25
At the same time, Japan expanded and diversified its aid program to
include more technology transfer and personnel exchange in compliance
with the demands from the aid-recipient countries for more genuine aid.
In the area of economic cooperation, specifically foreign direct
investment, Japan channeled hundred of millions into oil exploration and
drilling. This conformed to the past practice of investing in the
tapping and development of these resources that are absolutely crucial
to Japan, but by this time the emphasis was on petroleum development
because of the OPEC 1973 Oil Embargo.
This change first came about after the Tanaka Riots in 1974. Tokyo
interpreted this as the Southeast Asians' expression of their deep
dissatisfaction over the exisiting state of relations with Japan.
Japanese policy makers realized that Japan had a serious image problem
in the region. Japanese were perceived as capitalistic exploiters
solely interested in markets and profits. This greatly exacerbated the
urgency for Tokyo to review its past Southeast Asian policy.
The ASEAN continue to receive the largest share of Japanese aid to a
single region. Although bilateral loans remain the core element of
Japanese aid, their terms were vastly improved and a growing percentage
of it was in grants. For instance in 1978, 51.8 percent of Japanese ODA
was government loans with an interest rate that had been lowered to 3.5
percent and the deferment and repayment period extended to 6.7 years and
23.5 years, respectively.26 (However, Japanese loans were still more
expensive compared to those of other DAC members. The average interest
rate of DAC loans in the 1970s was only 2.6 percent. Repayment
schedules were also tighter for Japanese loans. The DAC average was a
grace period of 7.5 years and a repayment period of 29.7 years. In the
same Deriod. Japan's Export-Import Bank loans even charged an interest
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rate of 6.5 percent.27
Most of these concessionary loans and credits to the ASEAN were for
energy development and other related projects. Since the oil crisis,
Japan has affirmed its determination to enlarge its control over energy
sources. Consequently, it strongly favored assistance from international
organizations to public petroleum development in Southeast Asia to
reduce the monopoly of the Western oil companies in the exploration,
refinery and sale of oil.
The ASEAN governments welcome Japanese loans despite their less
favorable terms because other capital sources, e.g., the World Bank, the
IMF and commercial lending agencies considered loans for petroleum
development much too risky. The ASEAN economies are buyers of oil(the
price-takers) and had suffered tremendously from the sudden price hike
of the 1973 Oil Embargo. They had to expend large shares of their
precious capital resources on oil imports, capital that was also
essential in fulfilling other socio-economic demands. They are,
therefore, eager to attain greater self-reliance in energy and at the
same time to benefit from the surging oil prices if they were exporters.
Due to its substantial oil deposits- the most promising among the
ASEAN states before Brunei.joined the organization in 1984- and its
status as an OPEC member, Indonesia has received the largest portion of
Japanese, aid among the ASEAN states. It was in this period that Japan
replaced the U.S. to become the largest aid donor to Indonesia. In May
1972, a Japanese government loan of $200 million plus a commercial loan
of $100 million were given to Indonesia for oil exploration and the
Asahan Valley Dam project. As part of the loan agreement, Indonesia was
to supply Japan with 58 million kiloliters of low-sulphur oil* over a
ten-year span.28 A $1 billion loan was later added for the construction
of two LNG plants in North Sumatra and East Kalimantan.29 From 1971 to
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1972, Japan gave two $10 million untied, soft-term loans to Myanma, the
national oil company of Malaysia. These loans were also to be repaid by
crude at market price.30
This assistance have also earned Japan offshore concessions for
exploration and development of oil deposits in Indonesia through its
Japex-Indonesia Oil Company since the early 1970s.
The Japanese government also rendered technical assistance to the
ASEAN states. The Japan International Cooperation Agency(JICA) was
created in 1974 by the Japanese government. A semi-governmental
organization, it is the sole executor of official technical grants and
assistance to the developing countries. JICA also manages the Japanese
Peace Corps and is responsible for recruiting, training and dispatching
its volunteers to work in developing countries. In 1986 alone, JICA
sent some 7615 experts to the developing world.31 JICA also administers
over 130 training courses with over 3000 participants from 199 countries
coming to Japan for training every year.32
Since the early 1970s, Japan has been giving significant technical
and financial support to the Committee for Coordination of Offshore
Prospecting(CCOP) of ECAFE.33 Individually, Japan has offered technical
assistance in training indigenous technicians for the ASEAN public oil
companies and supplying them with data and equi_pments.34
On economic cooperation, Japan's ambition to secure and diversify
its oil sources was the primary factor for increasing Japanese foreign
direct investments(FDI) to the ASEAN. The willingness of the ASEAN
states to accept foreign equity participation in their natural resource
development served Japan well. By 1979, Japan had invested some $5.5
billion in the ASEAN countries. In each of the ASEAN economies,
Japanese capital accounted for more than 25 percent of all appproved
foreign investments.35 Japanese FDI in Indonesia consistently made up
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some 60 percent, of all Japanese capital investments in the ASEAN in the
1970s.
Table 10. Japanese FDI in ASEAN
(in million US$)
1951-65 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1986ASEAN 150 490 856 2946 3946 4581 7021 14324
Indonesia 51 242 473 1190 2703 3739 4424 8673
Malaysia 19 50 76 250 356 473 650 1283
Philippines 24 74 74 88 354 434 615 913
Singapore 17 33 90 222 305 544 936 2571
Thailand 12939 91 194 228 309 396 884
World Total 949 3577 6773 12662 19405 26809 36497 105970
Source: Keizai Koho Center, Japan 1988: An International Compari-
son (Tokyo: Keizai Koho Center, 1987), p. 50.
Japanese FDI in the ASEAN were still strongly inclined toward the
miningsector, especially in the post-oil crisis years from 1974 to 1977.
Each year, Japanese FDI in Indonesia expanded by approximately fifty
percent with most of the money going into energy industries. It
rose to 14 percent of total Japanese FDI in the world in 1977, making
Indonesia the largest recipient of Japanese FDI of any single country
after the U.S.36
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Table 11. Japan's FDI to ASEAN- By Sector
(in million U.S.$)
1976 19781977 1979
C A C A C A C A
Total Manufacturing
Industry: 125 195 151 240 211 635 212 316
Food 417 6 15 15 12 23 10
Textile 9 36 13 54 19 33 23 31
Wood Pulp 8 6 9 1 7 7
Chemistry 25 24 20 59 19 43 22 25
Metals 17 58 15 23 30 386 30 29
Machinery 10 6 12 34 40 23 51
Electric Machinery 16 10 16 5 62 39 27
Transport 9 7 9 24 S 39 8 33
14Others 43 50 34 18 37 102
Others:
Agriculture
Forestry 23 15 27 14 35 33 18 8
Fishery 7 5 7 3 2 1 10 10
Mining 10 800 11 339 4 176 3 143
Construction 14 6 16 3 20 14 20 12
Commerce 43 4 47 4 39 16 56 49
Finance Insurance 5 4 2 4 4 3 2 3
Others 39 1 22 24 26 23 42 50
Real Estate 5 0.1 8 1 17 3 10 1
Branch Office 10 3 10 5 8 12 7 3
TOTAL 281 1044 301 636 369 917 380 599
C- Cases
A- Amount
Source: Ministry of Finance, Government of Japan.
Japanese FDI in the manufacturing sector had also increased. The
number of cases rose rapidly in the areas of textiles, chemistry,
metals, machinery and electric machinery- a consequence of the new
Japanese industrial initiative of moving heavy and petro-chemical
industries to resource-rich countries like the ASEAN states. 17
During this period, Japan has sought greater prominence in regional
cooperative efforts because of declining U.S. influence in Southeast
Asia. At the First ASEAN Summit Conference in Bali in 1976, the ASEAN
members decided on five industrial projects to be carried out to
symbolize their economic unity.38 Japan promised material and technical
support to these projects and took part in other major cooperative






construction-of the Asian Highway.39
The Second ASEAN Summit Conference was held in Kuala Lumpur in July
the following year and Japan, New Zealand, and Australia were invited as
dialogue partners. After attending the meeting, Prime Minister Takeo
Fukuda toured the ASEAN states.40 In Manila, Fukuda commited a $1
billion aid package to the five joint-ASEAN projects and declared what
later came to be known as the Fukuda Doctrine.
The Fukuda Doctrine asserted several points delineating the future
course of Japan-ASEAN relations and Japan's role in the region:
1. that Japan will not become a military power
2. that Japan intends to expand cultural, social,
political ties with the ASEAN along with their
their economic ones
3. that Japan wishes to cooperate with the ASEAN
as equal partner while working for stable
relations with the Indochinese states and
4. that Japan will double its aid to the ASEAN in
five years, and raising imports from and
investment in the ASEAN.41
Japan declared its firm support for a Zone of Peace, Freedom and
Neutrality(ZOPFAN) proposed by the ASEAN. Thereafter, Japan had also
promoted other regional organizations or cooperation frameworks for
closer regional economic integration with Japan assuming a leadership
role. However, the ASEAN states have not given much attention to these
Japanese proposals as they have doubts on Japanese intentions and
capabilities in realizing these plans.
Being the largest subscriber of the ADB since 1972 and regularly
making large contributions to the Bank's Special Fund*and other special
purpose development funds of the Bank, Japan exerts great influence over
the Bank's lending policies. Top preference is given to development
loans on agricultural, agro-industrial, energy and transport and
communication development.42
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An overall assessment of Japanese aid during this period shows that
Japan's ODA had not been exceptional in comparison to those of other
developed countries. In percentage terms, with aid amounting to only
.29 percent of the GNP, Japan was still below the OECD average of .35
percent(Norway was up to 1.2 percent of its GNP Netherlands, .97
percent; Sweden, .85 percent), and well beneath its "1 percent of GNP"
pledge at UNCTAD III in 1972.43 Japan's argument for its failure to
meet this target was that per capita income in Japan is low compared to
those of Western Europe and the U.S.
Japanese aid was generally tied and with less favorable terms than
those of other developed states. Government aid(grants and loans) was
only 25 percent of total assistance- merely meeting the OECD
requirement- in contrast to 68 percent for the U.S., 55 percent for
France and 40 percent for U.K. In addition, a disproportionately large
part of official aid was in the form of direct bilateral loans.44
The ASEAN complained that there was not enough technical aid given
to them, specifically in the areas of research and development.45 They
were also outraged that Japan was still only interested in advancing its
economic interests through aid, displaying little or no concern for the
limitations, needs and requests of the aid-recipient -countries. And
that in exporting its industries to the ASEAN, Japan was alsos exporting
its pollution problems and creating new ones in the host countries. A
sintering plant in Mindanao, Philippines, built by Kawasaki Steel in
1977 was implicated in causing asthma among its workers and residents
near the plant. The Asahi Caustic Soda Plant in Thailand pollutes the
Chao Pulaya River.with its mercury-tainted disposals. The Mamut Copper
Mine of Japan's Overseas Mineral Resources Development Company in Suva,
Malaysia has damaged neighboring areas with its sludge and dirt.46
These shortcomings were the consequence of the Japanese government's
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short-sightedness and narrow-mindedness in international affairs. It
was still trying to respond to changes only when they occur and then
trying desperately to cope with the new situation and promote its
interests with only slight concern for the welfare of its cooperation
partners thereby setting ground for future conflicts.
1978 to the Present: Driving Toward
International Pre-Eminence
With the advent of the 1980s, Japan develops a different attitude
towards aid and economic cooperation as part of its Comprehensive
National Security Strategy. Economics is tied to politics and defense
requirements, contributing to the overall security of the state and its
economy. It reflects both the country's economic motivations and
security considerations, as well as its growing awareness of global
inter-dependence and its desire for a commensurate world status.
Japanese security and economic concerns are strongly affected by
Tokyo's political and economic relations with other industrialized
economies. Japan has a highly vulnerable economy. It feels threatened
by the rising tide of protectionism in the markets of the developed
economies combatting this by opening up new markets and expanding its
market share in them and the exisiting ones alike by elevating the level
of its overseas investments.
Japan's economic problems with the West, primarily bilateral trade
deficits and incidents involving military technology transfer and
illegal sale of technology to the Soviets by Japanese private business
concerns, have sparked political conflicts. Both the Americans and the
West Europeans accuse Japan of protectionism due to its often
unreasonably high tariffs and restrictions on foreign imports.
Then there are the defense considerations. Many Japanese are
disturbed by the impact of the present acrimonious state of relations
between their country and the U.S. on the Japan-U.S. security
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arrangements and U.S. commitment to Japan's defense.
For a long time, Japan asserts that its economic aid will contribute
to global peace and stability, ultimately benefitting Japan's own
security and prosperity. But in contrast to its past aid and economic
cooperation policy of simply exploiting raw materials and labor, Japan
places strong emphasis on the strategic political application of aid,
particularly to countries judged to be important to the West, pursuing
comprehensive security through aid.47
Humanitarian aid has also increased improving the socio-economic
conditions of life for the population of poverty-stricken developing
countries in order to stem the fermentation of popular discontent that
may give rise to political instability.
As a world power, it is under tremendous domestic and international
pressure to do more for the third world. The U.S. has been most
outspoken and vocal in asking Tokyo to share the burden of building up
pro-Western developing countries close to conflict areas. Increasing
Japanese awareness of Japan's economic strength and its diplomatic
influence in the world also attribute to Japan's growing willingness and
ambition for a political role in world affairs.
Takeshita had declared during his state visit to the U.S. in 1988
that he intends to make Japan responsible in the world.48 For years,
Japan has tried to establish itself as a full-fledged member of the
Western camp, most obviously and actively during Nakasone's tenure as
the prime minister. It has involved itself in numerous multilateral
agencies and international political and economic issues through its aid
contributions and global economic influence. Unlike military
assistance, foreign aid is less controversial and has the broad-based
support of the Japanese people, politicians and academics. It projects
Japan as a peace-loving country that is genuinely concerned with the
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welfare of developing nations.
The ASEAN becomes ever more important in this grand scheme of the
Japanese government. Nakasone's 1983 tour with gifts of aid packages
and loans was designed to win ASEAN backing for Japan's policies and
positions on international issues thereby strengthening Nakasone's own
footing at the Williamsburg Summit. And throughout the 1980s Japan has
made itself more visible in international politics, proposing to act as
an ASEAN spokesman in Washington and intermediary between Hanoi and the
ASEAN.49
In recent years, Japan's foreign economic aid has grown more quickly
than any other country, making it the largest global aid donor.
Fukuda's pledge to double Japanese aid disbursements in five years with
increases in the grant and technology elements of aid was realized in
just four years. Development assistance was raised from $1.43 billion
in 1977 to $3 billion in 1980.
In the same spirit, Suzuki announced in 1981 a new medium-term plan
to raise Japan's level of aid during the 1981-85 period to an aggregate
of $21 billion by 1985. The plan was, however,, hampered and made
impossible to fulfill due to Japanese fiscal austerity during the global
recession of the early 1980s. By the end of 1985, only an aggregate, of
18.1 billion or about 85 percent of the target was reached.
In September 1985, the cabinet of Nakasone approved a third medium-
term plan that covers a seven-year period from 1986 to 1992(later
reduced to five years, 1986-1990). The target was to disburse an
aggregate of $40 billion by 1992 arid double the 1985 aid total of $3.8
billion by 1992.50
Quantitatively, Japanese ODA has grown but more important, its
quality has improved considerably. Interest rates on ODA loans declined
by an average of 0.6 percent and according to OECD reports, more than 70
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percent of Japanese aid is now untied.51
By 1981, Japanese ODA was well over $3 billion annually. This makes
Japan the fourth largest donor within the OECD in dollar terms after the
U.S., France, and FRG. Japanese official aid totalled $3.8 billion in
1985, making Japan the third largest global aid donor, but the amount
was still a drop from 1984's $4.3 billion. Japanese ODA soared to $5.6
billion in 1986, largely because of the sharp rise in the yen's value.52
In FY1988-89, Japan's foreign aid budget came to $10 billion,
surpassing the U.S.'s $9.2 billion to make Japan the largest aid donor
in the world.53
Later at the Toronto Summit of the Big Seven in June 1988,
Takeshita announced that Japan would spend more than $50 billion in ODA
in the five years from FY1988 to FY1992.54 At the same time, he
introduced a $20 billion debt-relief program to help alleviate the Third
World debt crisis. This would be done through economic assistance to
the developing countries and refinancing their debts.55 Of this, $8
billion was to be transferred through multilateral agencies Japan's
OECD, its Export-Import Bank and private banks would co-finance World
Bank loans worth $9 billion and the rest would be untied loans from the
Export-Import Bank of Japan-56 Moreover, Japan would consider writing
off repayments on loans extended to a group of countries that has been
the poorest in the world since 1978.57
Its participation in many multilateral institutions other than the
IMF, IBRD, and ADB also act as conduits for recycling Japanese surplus
to the developing countries. This includes the African Development
Bank, which Japan is the second largest donor, the Inter-American
Development Bank, the Asian Productivity Organization and the Southeast
Asia Fisheries Development Center.58
Such Japanese generosity to and concern for the Third World debt
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problem is not entirely unfounded. Concurrently, Japan boasts foreign
exchange reserves estimated to 'be-at least $80 billion, by far the
largest in the world and four of the top five world banks are Japanese-
owned.59 The depreciation of the dollar versus a rising yen
significantly boosted Japan's economic muscle, making foreign
investments cheaper than ever before(partially explaining Japan's buying
binge in the real estate markets of the U.S. and Australia); yet this
has seriously worsened the Third World debt problem, especially for
countries having large yen-dominated loans.
The ASEAN economies are in just a position. They have been
particularly hard-hit by the appreciation of the yen, aggravating their
already heavy debt burden since yen loans make up a large proportion of
Japanese aid to them.
They had appealed to Japan for some assistance to compensate this
appreciation. Finally in December 1986, Japan acceded to lowering
interest rates on new loans.60 Other than this, Japan also recycles its
surplus to the ASEAN through ADB facilities. The ASEAN-Japan Industrial
Cooperation, a joint-stock company and satellite of the ASEAN Finance
Corporation(AFC), was set up in 1980 to provide equity funds and loans
to small- and medium-scale development projects. It would also
guarantee and underwrite project loans.61 The Bank's Y4.5 billion Japan
Special Fund was launched in 1988 to finance or co-finance technical
assistance grants and private-sector equity investments in developing
countries for industrialization, natural and human-resource development,
and technology transfer.62 Another ADB facility was created in 1988-
the Asian Development Equity Fund(ADEF). Around $100 million was set up
in collaboration with eight underwriting firms for the ADEF to recycle
surplus and promote equity market development in developing Asian
economies.63
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Although China has grown to become the single largest beneficiary of
Japanese largess since 1982, net donations to the ASEAN as a whole is
still the most substantial. Moreover, Japan remains the most important
contributor of ODA to the ASEAN.64
Table 12. Ten Major Recipients of Japan's
Bilateral ODA(riet disbursements)
1980 1982 1983Rank amount% Rank amountamount% Ran
1. Indonesia 350.03 17.9 1. China 350.15 22.4368.79 22.4 1. China2. Bangladesh 215.14 11.0 2. Indonesia 248.12 15.8294.55 12.4 2. Thailand3. Thailand 189.55 9.7 3. Bangladesh 235.46 15.0215.79 9.1 3. Indonesi4. Burma 152.46 7.8 4. Thailand 147.02 9.4170.32 7.2 4. Philippi
5. Egypt 122.97 6.3 5. Philippines 129.54 8.3136.38 5.8 5. India6. Pakistan 112.42 5.7 6. Burma 113.39 7.2103.93 4.4 6. Burma
7. Philippine 94.40 4.8 7. Pakistan 104.20 6.795.28 4.0 7. Banglade
8. South Kore 76.30 3.9 8. Malaysia 92.30 5.975.32 3.2 8. Malaysia
9. Malaysia 65.63 3.3 9. Sri Lanka 73.08 4.761.61 2.6 9. Sri Lank
10. Sri Lanka 44.78 2.3 10. Egypt 72.77 4.661.61 2.6 10. Pakistan
TOTAL 1960.80 100.0 TOTAL 1566.03 100.02367.33 100.0 TOTAL
Source: Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
SIvL.L Y 1 L/ 11111 I XU11 wUL 4-11 ul Jdpdnese uLR was alsoursect to the ASEAN
in 1983 to promote small business and various personnel, energy and
rural development projects.65 However, the ASEAN states were deeply
dissatisfied with Japan since a recession has kept Japan from meeting
the ASEAN's requests made at the 8th Japan-ASEAN Forum for improvement
in Japan's General System of Preferences Scheme, specifically lowering
tariffs and non-tariff barriers and expanding import quotas for certain
products. Because of this, they pressed Tokyo for another Japan-ASEAN
Forum to reiterate their demands, but no agreement was reached.66
As its economic health recovered, Japan increased grants-in-aid to
the ASEAN in 1984. A large grant donation of $170 million went to
Thailand in 1985.67 At the 1985 Post-Ministerial Conference, Japan
agreed to aid fifteen ASEAN projects-68 In 1985, grants to the ASEAN
reached $380 million, more than twice the 1980 amount. The same year,
Japan also gave grants to various ASEAN projects, including a project
for environment and hygiene improvement in Manila a pest and disease
forecasting and control unit in Indonesia and construction of a
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Machinery Industries Development Institute in Thailand, av
Table 13. Japan's Bilateral ODA to ASEAN Countr
(in million US$)
1980 1983 1986Country G L T G L T G L TIndonesia 59.2 290.8 350 60 175 235 110 51 161(17.9) (9.7) (4.2)
Malaysia 12.7 52.9 65.6 29 63 92 43 -6 37(3.3) (3.8) (1.0)
Philippines 35.7 58.6 94.4 61.9 85 147 80 358 438
(4.8) (6.1) (11.4)
Thailand 70.2 119 189 89 158 248 126 135 261
(9.7) (10.2) (6.8)
Singapore 3.7 3.7 8 -4 3.8 21 -6 15
(0.2) (0.2) (0.4)
TOTAL 702.9 725.8 914
(35.9) (30.0) (23.8)
Notes G- Grant element covering Aid and Technical Cooperation
L- Loan aid
T- Total
()- Figures in parentheses indicate percentage within Japan's
total bilateral ODA
Total includes ODA to Brunei which takes the form of technical co-
operation amounting to US$1 to 2 million each year.
SOURCE: Japan's ODA 1985 (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1985)
and Basic Statistics on Japan's Economic Cooperation (Tokyo:
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1987).
At the Foreign minister's Meeting in Singapore in June 1987, Japan's
Foreign Minister Tadashi Kuranari agreed in principle to prepare a major
fund to help promote ASEAN cooperation. In September that year,
Nakasone hinted that this fund would be at least $2 billion. With this
Tokyo successfully obtained an invitation to the Third ASEAN Summit for
the New Prime'Minister Noburo Takeshita.70 As a matter of fact, Japan
was the only dialogue partner invited to the summit, reflecting the
importance the ASEAN attaches to a friendly and close relationship with
Japan. In his speech at the meeting, Takeshita stressed three Japanese
policies to advance ASEAN-Japan cooperation:
1. to strengthen the economic resilience of the
ASEAN and Japan
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2. to promote political coordination between Japan
and the ASEAN and to promote a comprehensive
exchange plan, i.e., cultural, academic, and
personnel exchanges and
3. formalizing the ASEAN-Japan Development Fund,
the $2 billion aid package that is the first
part of a $20 billion recycling program.7'
The ASEAN-Japan Development Fund consists of two parts. First ar
investment fund of official and private resources to furnish loans to
the private sector and yen-dominated loans at a low interest rate of
three percent per annum for joint-ventures in the region.72 The second
part requires Japan to provide untied loans to the ASEAN through
development institutions in each country, e.g., the ADB.73
A mini-Marshall Plan was agreed by the ASEAN, the U.S., Japan and
the E.C. at the 1988 Annual ASEAN Meeting in Bangkok to help revitalize
the Philippine economy. Most recently in February 1989, the ASEAN
Poultry Disease Research and Training Center officially opened in
Malaysia. It was constructed with a Y1.3 billion Japanese grant and
supplied with Japanese technology.74
In the 1980s, technology transfer and cooperation are gaining
increasing importance in Japan's aid to the ASEAN, with these economies
all going full-throttle in their industrialization. Since 1980,
technical aid has come to account for about 17 percent of its bilateral
ODA, and official technology transfer rose 41 percent between 1980 and
1983.75
Between 1980 and 1988, Japan expanded its technology aid to the
ASEAN by initiating many technology cooperation projects. Technical
cooperation included personnel training, industrial, technology, socio-
economic, and health related development projects. It also became more
involved in the planning, execution and evaluation of these science and
technology projects.76 Equipment and machinery given for technology-
transfer purpose reached Y1651 million in 1986(or about US$10 million
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based on the exchange rate then)7
Among the technical cooperation projects agreed to between Japan and
the ASEAN from 1986 to 1988 were (1) an Industrial Technology Program to
dispatch Japanese experts on management and production techniques from
private Japanese companies to' ASEAN government agencies 78 (2) the
construction of a Computer Science, Robotics and Automan Training
Center (3) two bio-technology joint-ventures79 (4) a Japan-financed
training course on meterological satellite data and an ad-hoc Expert
Study Group on Meterological Facilities and Services for Aviation8O and
the establishment of a Training Center on Land Transportation in
cooperation with the ASEAN Committee on Transportation and
Communication. 81
Most of these are short-term projects nonetheless, Japan is
entering into more long-term projects including industrial technology
cooperation in quality control, plant renovation, assessment and
appraisal of mineral and energy resources, and cooperation in energy
development.82 To better facilitate long-term transfer of technology to
the ASEAN, a Japanese survey mission was sent to Technonet Asia to study
ways to efficiently transfer technology to the ASEAN and coordinate the
sharing of technology among the ASEAN member states.83
Japan is also participating in numerous social and urban development
projects of the ASEAN. Most of these are short-term projects and are
now in the planning stage. Most of its work in health-related
cooperation projects are now in the implementation stage and some have
already been completed.84
In response to. ASEAN reques-t-s, the focus of Japanese ODA to the
region has shifted away from large industrial ventures to the
development of agricultural industries and human resourcesm and
cultivating small- and medium-sized businesses. Japan is still very
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much interested in exploring energy sources but it is also trying to
develop renewable energies in the ASEAN. As the third medium-term
target had outlined, Japanese aid now aims at effective and efficient
implementation of aid, better coordination between technical and
financial assistance and evaluation of aid projects.85.
To optimize the impact of these assistance on the developing
economies, Tokyo wants better coordination with non-governmental aid
organizations within Japan, e.g., the Tokyo Foundation, Asian Community
Trust, Japan International Volunteers Center and the OISCA Industrial
Development Body, who are increasingly involved in Japan's aid program,
and with other donor countries and international organizations like the
OECD's DAC group.86
















Foreign direct investments are becoming more important to the ASEAN
states than economic aid. Since the ASEAN governments all employ
export-led development strategies, they do like and have been asking for
more FDI to the region to finance industrialization. Moreover, as these
developing economies prospering, less aid will be make available to them
by international agencies.
Japanese FDI in the ASEAN region continue to expand by more than
$900 million annually, but the amount as share of Japan's annual global
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investment has been diminishing, dropping to only 16 percent in 1985.87
An enormous portion of Japanese capital investments has been flowing
into North America, Western Europe and Australia since 1985. This was
possibly prompted by intensifying trade frictions between Japan and
these economies causing Japan to adopt an export-substitution strategy
by putting up factories within these markets to circumvent foreign legal
protectionist measures and at the same time maintain and enlarge its
market share in these economies. This includes the Honda and Mazda
automobile assembly plants in the U.S., an upcoming Toyota automobile
parts factory in England and Japanese acquisition of Firestone, a major
U.S. tire-maker. In these investments Japan capitalizes on its strong
yen, which makes FDI and other purchases less expensive.
Japanese FDI in the ASEAN still constitutes nearly 60 percent of
Japanese investments in Asia and almost half of Japan's global
investment in natural resource development, with Indonesia receiving a
dominant share of it.88 Looking at this from the ASEAN perspective, the
importance of Japanese investment in the ASEAN is greatly magnified for
over half of all FDI in the ASEAN comes from Japan.89
Japan continues to place heavy emphasis on energy development and
minerals exploration with 47 percent of its FDI in the region
concentrated in these activities, e.g., nearly all Japanese FDI in
Brunei goes exclusively to the gas and oil industry. Nevertheless, in
response to ASEAN demands for more investments in the manufacturing
sector, Japan has raised its investments in this area to some 40 percent
of its FDI in the ASEAN.90 The ASEAN governments hope that investment
in the manufacturing industries will help relieve unemployment in their
over-crowded urban centers and produce skilled workers crucial to their
future industrial development.
In Brunei the unavailability of labor and natural resources other
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than oil limits Japanese investments to the oil and gas industry. In
Indonesia, Japanese investments are found mostly in the extractive
industries- coal mines, oil fields, hydroelectic plants- but cases of
cooperation in the manufacturing sector have been increasing, including
the car-making and production of electrical appliances. In Malaysia,
the situation is similar, plus a strong Japanese presence in the
construction industry with Japanese companies responsible for a quarter
of all its construction projects. Toyota and other major Japanese
automobile makers have manufacturing and assembly plants in the
Philippines. Nippon Steel and Toshiba also operate in the islands.
Singpore hosts manufacturing and processing operations for many top
Japanese computer and home appliance giants- Sanyo, Toshiba and Hitachi
to name a few- and Japanese capital built Singapore's construction and
shipbuilding and repairing industries.91
To better promote private capital investments in the ASEAN, the
Japanese government has set up the Japan-ASEAN Investment Company in
1983 to provide funds for capital participation in mutually beneficial
economic undertakings. An initial capital fund of $55 million was
committed by the Japanese government and private sources to launch the
scheme. Kaidanren, the powerful Japanese business organization,
established an international cooperation project promotion company
with sixty leading Japanese companies in April 1989. Its aim is to
bring investment into the developing countries by acting as an
intermediary between the host country and investors and also as a
guarantor for Export-Import Bank loans.92
Japanese investments in the ASEAN have helped to ease the
unemployment situation and the Japanese MNCs operating in these
countries have brought to the ASEAN economies their marketing and
production know-how, make available to them supporting facilities like
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credit loans and link these economies with the global marketing network.
As the ASEAN economies are growing rapidly, they will also need to
generate more foreign capital through exports so international trade has
become ever more important to their overall industrial and economic
development.
Japan has tried to accommodate ASEAN demands for better access of
ASEAN exports into Japan. At the 5th UNCTAD Conference in Manila in May
1979, Prime Minister Ohira promised more and better aid, improved access
forexports of developing countries into Japan and stated Tokyo's support
for a Common Fund for commodity price stabilization and engaging Japan
in manpower development in the third world.93
In his visit to the ASEAN in 1981, Suzuki indicated Japanese
willingness to improve economic cooperation with the ASEAN states
especially in assisting the development of agriculture, energy, human
resources and the rural areas through management and technical
training.94
For the first time, Japan is assisting the promotion of ASEAN
exports to Japan with considerable institutional and non-institutional
involvement.
On the institutional side, the Manufacturers' Import Promotion
Organization was established by MITI in February 1978 to facilitate
imports by supplying free display in Japan for foreign manufacturers. A
Common Fund on Commodity Agreements with $61 million from Japan was
created in June 1980. An ASEAN Export Stabilization Scheme(ASEBEX) was
adopted in response to the long-running and mounting ASEAN demands for
such a scheme. Its main function, as its name suggests, is to
stabilize prices of specific primary commodities the ASEAN exports to
Japan. This is done by compensating(or replenishing) for a price
downfall(or increase) when price fluctuations exceed a certain range
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measured from the base level of these exports to Japan. Tokyo extended
the country's General Scheme of Preferences(GSP) to the ASEAN for
quotas under the GSP for ASEAN industrial products to be effective from
1984 onward was announced by Nakasone during his ASEAN tour in 1983.96
Japan is the only OECD member to include in its GSP wider coverage
for ASEAN products and to treat all ASEAN countries as a single entity
so that approved imports from one ASEAN country can be regarded as
wholly originating in another ASEAN country as well.97
The Cumulative Origin Principle, effective since April 1978, hay
proved itself beneficial to the ASEAN as it aids them in the export of
raw materials processed within the ASEAN, e.g. plywood made from
Southeast Asian lumber. The MITI has organized Import Promotion
Missions to the ASEAN to show what the ASEAN economies have to offer
Japan and advised ASEAN businessmen on ways to enter the Japanese
market. 98 In 1985, an action program to improve market access to
foreign imports with tariff cuts on a variety of products of interest to
the ASEAN was introduced. And an ASEAN Trade Promotion Center was
officially opened in 1988.99
Non-institutional aid to promote ASEAN exports to Japan include
visits of JETRO's export promotion policy advisers to the region.100 It
has also organized and sponsored numerous seminars, symposia and
exhibitions within the region so that indigenous trading companies would
achieve better organization and coordination in their attempt to
penetrate the Japanese market.101
The ASEAN as a whole still enjoys a small trade surplus with Japan,
but individually only Malaysia and Indonesia(and since 1984 Brunei) have
a substantial trade surplus with Japan because of their energy exports
to Japan. Thailand and Singapore enjoy no surplus at all and in the
another ten years.95 Moreover, a fifty percent rise in the ceiling of
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case of the Philippines only a very small one. The industrialization of
these economies will reduce this surplus as they will have to purchase
more capital goods from Japan and other foreign sources. This will.
further cut down their surplus because of the appreciation of the _yen.
Table 15. Japan's Trade with ASEAN
(in million US$)
Year Indonesia Malaysia Philippines iirigapor Thailand
1978 Ex 2016 1373 1349 2509 1645
Im 4566 1695 828 981 830
Balance
-2550 -233 521 1645 815
1979 Ex 2101 1757 1480 3004 1843
Im 7189 2595 1208 1366 1126
Balance
-5088 -833 272 1638 717
1980 Ex 3458 2061 1686 3911 1917
I m 13167 3471 1951 1507 1119
Balance
-9709 -1410 -268 2404 798
1981 Ex 4123 2424 1928 4468 2251
Im 13305 2927 1731 1944 1061
Balance -9182 -503 197 2524 1190
1982 Ex 4261 2502 1803 4373 1907
Im 12005 3010 1576 1826 1041
Balance -7744 -508 227 2547 866
3552 2771 1744 .4448 25061983 Ex
10432 3131 1306 1468 1019Im
-6880 -360 438 2980 1483Balance
3073 2875 1080 4610 24251984 Ex
11175 4412 1419 1775 1040Im
-8102 -1537 -339 2835 1385Balance
2172 2168 937 3860 20301985 Ex
10119 4330 1243 1594 1027Im
-7947 -2162 -306 2266 1003Balance
2662 1708 1088 4577 20301986 Ex
7311 3846 1221 1468 1390Im
-4649 -2138 -133 3109 640Balance
Source: MITI.
Albeit that Japan has been improving and increasing its economic aic
to developing countries, there are still many complaints from other DAC
members and recipient countries that Japan is not giving enough. Its
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ODA-GNP ratio is still one of the lowest within the DAC even if it
boasts the largest global GNP. For instance, in dollar terms, Japan was
the third largest aid donor within the DAC group in 1985, but its ODA
was only 0.29 percent of its GNP, very much lower than the U.N.
recommended average of .70 percent. The grant element of aid was also
the lowest. DAC members have an average of 86 percent, but Japan'
grants-in-aid was only 73.6 percent of its ODA.102 In absolute dollar
terms, Japan's aid has grown tremendously but as ratio of its GNP it has
been declining and the same is also true for its ODA program.
['able 16. Economic Aid of DAC Member Countries to
Developing Countries (1984)
Total Economic Ratio Govt Economic Total
Aid 100m US$) to GNP(%) Aid(100m USS) to (NP(%)
France 59.0 1. 62 37.9 0.77
Netherlands 20.5 1.65 12.7 1.02
Japan 160.5 1.30 43.2 0.35
Germany, F.R. 65.1 1.06 27.8 0.45
United Kingdo 37.9 0.88 14.2 0.33
Canada 28.4 0.87 16.3 0.55
United States 285.9 0.78 87-1 0.36
TOTAL DAC
COUNTRIES LOO.O U. JO
Source: MITI.
Table 17. Economic Aid of DAC Member Countries to
Developing Countries (1985)
Total Economic Ratio Gov't Economic Total
Aid(100m US$) to GNP(%) Aid (100mUSS) to GNP(%)
France 88.7 1.74 40.0 0.78
Netherlands 26.3 2.11 11.4 0.91
Japan 0.84112.4 38.0 0.29
0.92Germany, F.R. 57.5 29.4 0.47
0.81Jnited Kingdom 36.7 15.3 0.34
0.51Canada 16.9 16.3 0.49





Table 18. Japan's ODA, 1975-85
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
bil. US$ 2.20 2.64 3.30 3.17 3.02 3.76 4.32 3.80
As% of GNP 0.23 0.26 0.32 0.28 0.28 0.33 0.35 0.29
As average of
DAC total 0.35 0.34 0.37 0.35 0.38 0.36 0.36 0.35
Source: MITI and MFA. Government of Japan
Tokyo explains that poor Japanese ODA performance is the result dof
slow disbursement of budgeted funds, particularly OECF loans. Each
year, nearly a third of the OECF budget remains unused. The major
obstacles, according to Japanese officials, are the inability of the
debt-ridden countries to absorb new loans and suspension of aid to risky
projects and countries. The current trend of undertaking smaller-scale
and lower-cost development projects, the slow implementation of programs
and even the difficulty of finding worthwhile projects in often
unfamiliar countries are other reasons.103
Tokyo further justified its preference for bilateral loans and
assistance over multilateral contributions by saying that Japan prefers
more direct supervision over and evaluation of the Japanese aid-financed
projects for maximum effectiveness and efficiency.
However, it would be unfair to criticize Japan for giving tied aid
because nearly 70 percent of Japanese aid is now untied. Furthermore,
it is not uncommon to find tied aid among other DAC members, e.g., about
50 percent of all American development assistance is tied and buy
American provisions of U.S. laws require much of the donations to be
spent on U.S. goods.104 Another point is that a great deal of Japanese
donations to multilateral agencies for relieving the Third World debt
does not show up in the OECD tally.'05
On aid and economic cooperation, another controversial issue is
technical assistance. Critics charge that it is still relatively low
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and that there is still the tendency of Japan to overemphasize official
export credits and private investments as part of its development aid
effort.
On trade, the asymmetry that ruled Japan-ASEAN trade relations in
the past decades continue today, with the difference widening. Japan's
economic importance to the ASEAN is greater than it had ever been but at
the same time, there is a decline in the region's economic i.mportance to
Japan. This is most extreme in the case of Indonesia. Japan buys about
40 percent of Indonesia's total exports but the figure represents only 7
percent of Japan's total imports. On the other hand, Indonesia buys
27.1 percent of its imports from Japan, or only 2.2 percent of Japan's
total exports.l06
As part of its new security effort, Japan is not only expending much
assistance to the Asian-Pacific countries which are considered vital to
Japan's national security. Its aid to other areas certainly shows a new
Japan that is more sensitive to international problems and more prepared
to help. It has offered $4 billion to help Latin American countries
with their debt problems. It has a well-established.aid program in sub-
Saharan Africam assisting in hunger-relief and health-related projects,
agriculture technology -transfer and personnel training. The African
governments gladly welcome Japanese assistance at a time when Western
-aid is falling. Another merit of Japanese aid to the African
governments is that it is generally free of any political constraints
that are so common of aid packages from the U.S. and former colonial
rulers-107
Indeed if Japanese aid is applied benevolently, it can serve to
improve the socio-economic condition of many Third World countries,
earning Japan their respect and support, making Japan a model for
emulation. In 1982, Malaysia's Prime Minister Mahathir has openly
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espoused a Look East Policy using Japan as a model for development-
the first among the ASEAN.1o8 In the late 1970s and the early 1980s,
Singapore had advocated a Learning from Japan Movement but the program
was not formally adopted as part of the country's development policy as
it is in Malaysia. Moreover, economic cooperation would supplement aid.
If carried out wisely and conscientiously, it would be mutually




CULTIVATION OF AN ASEAN ELITE
For security reasons and national pride, Japan yearns deeply for
global power status. It has expended billions of dollars on development
aid to the third world to build up an international reputation as a
responsible, peace-loving and politically-conscious economic superpower.
Although its generous economic and technical aid have broadened Japan's
global visibility and influence and had enticed foreign governments to
foster more amiable ties with Japan, they have unfortunately failed to
change the attitude of the people of these developing countries towards
Japan. Japan is still regarded as a one-time military aggressor, and
today seen as a greedy economic monster that is gobbling up every bit of
the earth's resources for its own selfish gains.
In Japan's view, the benevolent intentions of the Japanese
government and the Japanese people are grossly misunderstood. Japan
reasons that it gives aid for world peace and stability so that all
countries, including Japan, can carry out their economic development in
a peaceful and stable international environment. It rallies for the
support of developing countries for its policies because Japan feels it
is capable of doing something for them and is willing to. Its aid to
the developing countries holds no ulterior motives, rather it should be
taken as a gift or a form of assistance as one friend would extend to
another.
Other governments like the superpowers, the U.K., France, were(or
still are) colonial powers. These third world governments are invited
by these world-class powers to join their politico-military alliances
with unambiguous motives that aim to advance the national interests of
these world powers rather than those of the developing ones.
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It is true that third world governments often feel frustrated and
vent their anger at these major powers in international conferences and
agencies. Yet at the same time, they respect the ideals of their
oppressors and exploiters and look to them for guidance and support.
Then what affects the attitude of these people toward foreign countries,
particularly that of the elites of these societies who are in a position
to influence public opinions and their governments' decisions?
A fundamental difference is in their thinking, for a great many of
these third world elites are educated in the schools of their former
colonizers or those of their political allies, or both. In addition,
technical and scientific experts, e.g., the U.S. Peace Corps, are
regularly sent to these developing countries to aid them in their socio-
economic projects. Aside from technical and education programs, there
are also athletic and cultural contacts that build up better mutual
understanding and bonds between these third world elites and their
benefactors.
These men and women, having absorbed the thoughts, ideals, and
cultures of their teachers become more willing.to work with their
benefactors in various forms of diplomatic, security, economic, and
political cooperation because they feel closer affinity to their
benefactors in ideology, commitment and goals.
Japan understands the significance of personnel and cultural
exchanges as it, too, benefitted from the enlightened guidance of
the U.S. So to promote a more positive third world opinion of Japan,
Japan has taken the initiative to cultivate third world elites so that
they will have a .more profound understanding of Japan. The ASEAN
countries are especially important in this scheme. Other than meeting
the Japanese comprehensive security needs for resources, labor arid
communication links, the ASEAN is crucial in fulfilling Japan's ambition
to become a prominent leader or representative of the Asian-pacific
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region.
The ASEAN is the only corporate political entity that is willing and
ready to render diplomatic support to Japan in exchange for economic
assistance. (Although China is the largest receiver of Japanese aid, its
size and location makes it a world power and a competitor for the
leadership of Asia. South Korea is bogged down by its internal
turbulences even if it were not, the Korean people are still strongly
suspicious of Japan. Hong Kong is only a colony and will soon revert to
China. Taiwan is an important trading partner but it is no longer an
influential force in international politics. India is too independent
to overtly support Japanese diplomatic initiatives and considers itself
a leader in South Asia and in the third world's Non-Aligned Movement.)
Simultaneously, the ASEAN has grown to become an influential and
respected force in regional affairs, especially on issues concerning
Indochina and U.S. military deployments in Asia. For a long time, Japan
did not have a clear-cut, independent Indochina policy. In finding
itself a place on this important regional issue, Tokyo endorsed the
ASEAN's position on the Kampuchean question in the late 1970s and had
repeatedly reiterated its strong support for it. Eventually, this
support for the ASEAN's Kampuchean policy turned into a springboard for
Japan's own, similar Indochina policy. Japan needs the cooperation of
the ASEAN states to lend credibility to its Indochina policy.
On the issue of defense, the U.S. maintains military installations
in South Korea, Thailand, Japan, and the Philippines. Around 49,000 U.S.
troops are stationed in Japan, 41,000 in South Korea, 15,600 in the
Philippines and some 21,000 afloat in East Asia and the Pacific as part
of the U.S. 7th Fleet.1
U.S. military presence had been important in sustaining the
vulnerable freedom and stability of Asia from the 1950s to the 1970s
when rnmmunist Pxnansion and domestic insurgencies hruaht havoc, in the
72
region. But with the communist threat gone and domestic situations
stabilized, plus the fact that the general political atmosphere is
becoming more tranquil, Asians are questioning the necessity of the U.S.
military. The presence of U.S. armed forces is cursed as a symbol of
foreign domination and that this presence exposes the host countries to
pre-emptive strikes by U.S. adversaries. Anti-American sentiment is
especially strong among the young people who grew up in a relatively
stable and prosperous environment. They know nothing of America's
contribution to their country's freedom and prosperity for they have
not experienced war nor lived through the tumultuous years of the 1960s.
They deplore the American military presence and want it out.
Washington may indeed have to reduce some of its forces in the Asia-
Pacific theatre in response to Moscow's Asian initiatives. This would
put Japan in a very helpless position since military expansion may
induce Asian resentment and animosity. Consequently, Japan is very much
behind the ASEAN's proposal for collective security among the ASEAN
countries. Japan hopes to involve the JSDF in some collective defense
effort of the ASEAN on an equal partnership basis. In 1981, Japan began
training a small number of ASEAN officers and cadets-2 The ASEAN's
acceptance of the JSDF is thus extremely important to Japan. However,
individually and collectively, the governments of Japan and the ASEAN
know that they cannot fully guarantee the region's security without the
U.S. and thus favor some sort of military and security cooperation with
the U.S. in the event of U.S. withdrawal from the region.
The cultivation of ASEAN elites supportive of Japan's peace and
development initiatives is therefore absolutely essential to Japan's
quest for security and success in the international power game. And as
more and more Japanese capital is entering the ASEAN economies, an ASEAN
population that is more familiar with Japanese culture would facilitate
smoother and more Productive cooperation.
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More personnel contacts through cultural, educational, athletic an
various other kinds of exchanges would aid to foster better mutua
understanding. These exchanges between Japan and foreign countries
especially with those of the developing world, would have a significan,
domestic impact on Japan. It would make the new generation of JaPaneso
more conscious of the external environment, encouraging wider supporl
for the Japanese government's aid programs and allow Japanese leader
greater leverage in foreign policy in the pursuit for comprehensivE
security.
Throughout the 1950s and the 1960s almost all of Japan's personnel
exchanges were with the ASEAN countries. These programs were severely
limited in scope and scale. The lack of Japanese commitment, as the
Japanese government had argued, was due to its lack of experience and
the inadequacy of personnel necessary to implement large-scale projects.
In the 1950s, there were the Colombo Plan and some U.N. technical
assistance programs in which Japan took part in. These activities were
mainly geared toward technology transfer. As a matter of fact,
technical aid constituted a substantial proportion of Japanese aid
during this period for it did not call for any considerable transfer of
financial resources when Japan was already engaged in its reparations
program. There were some cultural exchanges but other kinds of
coordinated people-to-people contacts were practically non-existent.
In the 1960s, Japan started a number of education exchange programs
with the ASEAN states. Malaysian, Thai, and Filipino scholars began
studying in Japan under Japanese government scholarships.3 The Japanese
government sponsored Japanese studies programs at the University of
Malaya(Malaysia) and Ateneo de Manila University(Philippines), provided
them with office automation equipments and books, and Japanese
instructors were sent to teach at these centers.4 An Association for
Overseas Technical Scholarships(AOTS), funded entirely by the Javanese
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government, was established to train workers from developing countries.
Other personnel contacts included an exchange of journalists between
Japan and the Philippines, several Southeast Asian youth goodwill
missions to Japan, and under the Colombo Plan many Japanese students
were studying in Southeast Asian universities. Cultural and athletic
contacts included exchanges of dance troupes, specialists on traditional
arts and judo and boxing experts.
By the end of 1970, AOTS had sent some 5000 Southeast Asians to
Japan.5 In the same year, Japan made plans to establish a Japanese
study center at Thailand's Thammasat University for research on Japan-
related subjects.6 The Japanese government created JICA in 1974 to
handle government-based technical assistance and operation of the
Japanese Peace Corps. Education, cultural and athletic exchanges
expanded by the main focus was on technical transfer as the ASEAN
governments were most eager to obtain Japanese technology. Yet this
emphasis on technology transfer was also part of the national economic
strategy of Japan in the 1970s. Since Japan was making large capital
investments in the ASEAN economies, a great deal of them concentrating
in the budding ASEAN oil industry, Japan had to train large number of
Southeast Asians the technical know-how for these industrial operations.
From the 1950s to the early 1970s, growth and expansion of the scope
and scale of exchanges between Japan and the ASEAN had been
considerable. The ASEAN economies had greatly benefitted from the
transfer of technology and skills from Japan through education and
training programs. Nonetheless, it cannot be denied that Japan, too,
had been able to- advance its economic interests in the region through
these exchanges so much so that, Japan had often been sharply
criticized for giving technology and conducting exchanges only when they
served Japanese economic purposes. For instance, the AOTS training
„rnramc only taught Japanese industrial practices to the ASEAN
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trainees. Such training would not effectively enable them to find jobs
in non-Japanese industrial enterprises in their home countries. Ir
effect, these programs were training workers for Japanese business
operations in the ASEAN. More often than not, ASEAN requests for more
advance technology were either turned down or ignored as they were
deemed unncessary for the largely labor-intensive Japanese enterprises
in the region.
Little was achieved in promoting mutual understanding between the
peoples of Japan and the ASEAN. These cultural contacts carried heavy
emphasis on the unilateral transfer of Japanese culture and work ethics
to the ASEAN countries. Japan showed little tolerance and respect for
the Southeast Asians'cultures, traditions, values, and customs.
Cultural and athletic exchanges were sporadic and usually only for
promotional purposes. Not many ASEAN students were keen on studying in
Japan because of the language barrier and again because many fear that
they may be unable to find jobs with a Japanese degree in their own
countries. Job offers from Japanese firms were readily available, but
the prospect for career advancement is very low,as high management
positions are always occupied by Japanese nationals. Gradually,
dissatisfaction and contempt for the Japanese grew among these strongly.
nationalistic and proud Southeast Asians, culminating in the ugly Tanaka
Riots in 1974.
Japan's adventure into cultural diplomacy could have said to begun
in 1972 with Tanaka's creation of the Japan Foundation. The
organization was the first of its kind to receive strong support from
the Japanese government to promote Japanese studies and personnel
exchanges with foreign countries.? Immediately after Tanaka's ASEAN
visit, Japan wanted to increase exchanges but the Oil Crisis and the
ensuing recession had impeded all efforts.
So it was in the Fukuda Doctrine announced in 1977 that the Javanese
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government initiated the first wholesale effort at improving cultura
and social ties with the ASEAN.
Under the Fukuda aid program, $5 million was specifically designate
for an ASEAN Cultural Fund.8 Succeeding administrations continue t
increase emphasis on personnel exchanges between Japan and the ASEAN
Ohira introduced an ASEAN Youth Scholarship Program in 1980. In 1981
Suzuki promised human resources development during his ASEAN tour an(
committed $100 million to the ASEAN to build training centers in their
own country and extra funds for a main training center in Okinawa.`
Suzuki also set up a Regional Studies Promotion Program the followinj
year.'0 Nakasone came up with a 21st Century Friendship Program in 1982
to boost personnel exchange in the cultural and education areas.l
Takeshita unveiled his Japan-ASEAN Comprehensive Exchange Program.at the
Third ASEAN Summit in 1987 that aims at expanding technical, academic,
research, athletic,and cultural exchanges between the ASEAN and Japan.
Other objectives are greater financial assistance for foreign students,
promotion of intra-ASEAN technical exchange and the creation of a Center
for Promotion of Cultural Exchange between Japan. and the ASEAN.12
Furthermore, Nakasone's 21st Century Friendship Program was extended for
another five years after it expires in 1989 to send a addition of 4000
ASEAN youths to Japan.
Particularly on cultural exchange, Japan has shown greater
sensitivity since the Tanaka Riots to compensate for its past
callousness. The emphasis is now on the introduction of ASEAN cultures
to the Japanese, and suggesting' "equal partnership" in cultural
cooperation instead of its past practice of unilateral transfer of
Japanese culture to the ASEAN. Under planning is the first-ever ASEAN
film festival in Japan, and many ASEAN artists have already been invited
to perform or hold exhibitions in Japan. 13 A recent Japanese cultural
missinn recommended reforms in the Japanese education system to better
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suit the needs of foreign students and to double the Japan Foundation's
annual budget to finance more ASEAN scholars to study iii Jalpari. 14 Even
aid from the private sector has become less self-centered. Matsushita's
PHP Institute has offered post-graduate scholarships to ASEAN students
without obliging the recipients to write papers with themes related to
Japan or to be in Japan for the duration of his study or research.15
To satisfy the ASEAN need for more management personnel, Japan set
up a $700,000 scholarship at the ADB. Individuals would be chosen by
the ADB's developing member countries and recipients may study in any
international institution in the area of management, technolgy, and
other development-related fields-16
To cultivate personnel for the growing ASEAN insurance, finance and
banking businesses, Japan financed several study tours to Japan for
ASEAN executives working in these areas, e.g., the Japan-ASEAN
Cooperation Promotion Program's tour for ASEAN insurance officials to
Japan in 1988.17
On the exchange of technical personnel, the ASEAN has been sending
the largest number of trainees to Japan through JICA. From 1954 to
1980, an aggregate of 2990 Japanese experts went to the ASEAN countries
and 11,400 ASEAN trainees were received in Japan with Japanese
government sponsorship. Since JICA handles only government-based
exchange programs, the total number of experts and trainees sent and
received by Japan should be be much higher.18
To overcome the language barrier that discourages foreign students
from studying in Japan, Japan and the ASEAN governments are working
closely to promote the study of the Japanese language. Results have
been very encouraging. In Singapore, the Education Ministry's Foreign
Language Center holds intensive Japanese language courses for junior
highschool students. The Department of Japanese Studies at the
Singapore National University and the Japanese government have made
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plans to jointly develop the center into an international center for
Japanese studies in Southeast Asia. 14 In Malaysia, Mahathir designated
Japanese as the third foreign language in the country's highschool
curriculum. Japanese instructors were invited to teach at the National
University of Malaya, the National Administration Institute and other
education organs. The Japan-Malay Society and other private
organizations are also setting up Japanese courses to meet the rising
demand for Japanese studies.20
Yet all is not well in Japan-ASEAN cultural exchanges. First, Japan
is trapped in a very awkward situation. On one hand, the ASEAN states
complain that there is not enough cultural contacts with Japan. On the
other, they are not genuinely interested in learning more about the
Japanese culture or teaching the Japanese their cultures. Rather, they
are more keen on getting Japanese finance and technical know-how. Japan
has come to realize the importance of cultural exchange to erase the
misconceptions they have of each other, but the ASEAN has not. New
exchange projects and channels are opened up by Japan the ASEAN only
takes them for granted and criticize when reality does not meet their
high expectations. Second, Japan is willing to increase cultural
contacts but the country is not mentally and physically well-prepared
for it. There are not enough manpower or facilities to handle large
number of foreign students. Foreign students are placed in second-grade
institutions because of severe domestic competition at top universities
like Kyoto and Tokyo University which leaves few spaces for foreigners.
The Japanese government locates training centers for third world
students in places far removed from the major cities, places like
Okinawa. The government justifies this policy by saying that the
weather conditions in Okinawa would better suit third world foreign
students, since most of them come from tropical places like the ASEAN
countries, South Asia, Latin America and Africa. It is not clear what
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the reasons are for keeping foreign students from the major urban
centers, especially those from the third world that are often seen as
inferior to the Japanese. Perhaps the Japanese government does not
feel that the majority of. Japanese are ready for a large influx of
foreigners, but then when would be the right time? Third, Japan sees
itself as a teacher of the ASEAN, setting the rules and terms for
exchange. Rarely does it ever make changes or adopt new ways to make
exchanges more productive. A fine example is Japan's chauvinistic
attitude towards its language. It is not making any significant effort
to raise the England standard of Japanese instructors. Instead it is
encouraging more Southeast Asians to learn Japanese. Since Southeast
Asians are generally more familiar with English, they prefer to study in
the U.S., Australia, U.K. or some other Enlgish-speaking countries,
leaving Japan as a poor fourth or fifth choice for overseas studies.
Fourth, there are deep-seated suspicions among some Southeast Asians on
Japan's political and economic motives for studying their cultures.
Even with all the progress made so far and despite their willingness to
cooperate with Japan. the ASEAN elites are still far, more suspicious of
Japan than they are of the U.S. or any other ally.
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CHAPTER V
THE DIFFICULTIES OF GTVTNG AND RECEIVING
Both the Japanese and the ASEAN governments would surely agree that
economic aid and exchanges between them have significantly contributed
to promoting Japan-ASEAN relations. They have served to foster greater
goodwill between the peoples of Japan and the ASEAN countries. In 1983,
Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs conducted opinion polls among the
ASEAN populations. An overwhelming majority of those questioned
expressed their trust in Japan. The average for the ASEAN countries was
over 74 percent. Indonesia, consistently receiving the bulk of Japanese
aid, ranked the highest with 88 percent of Indonesians surveyed replied
that they trust Japan. The 1987 poll showed a similar response. This
time the Philippines topped the list with 92 percent of those surveyed
expressing their trust and goodwill towards Japan.' This was likely due
to Japan's generous financial support for the new government of
President Aquino since its establishment and the fact that the
Philippines was desperately in need of economic assistance after nearly
three years of negative growth and domestic economic and political
instability. In a way, promises of Japanese aid have become a backbone
of continuing goodwill and cooperation between Japan and the ASEAN.
However well development aid has served to strengthen Japan-ASEAN
relations, there are much difficulties for both sides in giving and
receiving assistance.
Japan basically feels its economic relations with the ASEAN is a
real dilemma- a no win situation for Japan. First, the ASEAN
constantly askes Japan for more aid. If Japan declines, it is
considered stingy, insincere and incapable of acting as big brother to
the rpvion. On the other hand, when Japan does give more, it is seen as
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targeting on domination of the region. In the 1960s and 1970s, when
Japan concentrated its aid and investments in the agricultural and
mining industries, it was indeed done to advance certain Japanese
economic interests, but it is not entirely wrong to expect some economic
compensation for its efforts. Furthermore, these assistance had
significantly contributed to the early post-war economic development of
these fledging economies. Unfortunately, Japan was accused for not
doing enough to develop the bountiful labor resources of these
countries.
So Japan began to divert more of its resources into the
manufacturing industries of these economies to create jobs and provided
training appropriate for the circumstances. Because of this, Japan was
criticized for not transferring enough high technology, dumping obsolete
Japanese equipments in Southeast Asia and neglecting development of the
vastly untapped agricultural and mineral resources of these countries.
Japan reasons that it is not unwilling to transfer high technology to
the ASEAN countries but the ASEAN economies were not ready for such
transfer. They did not have the people with the knowledge and training
necessary to utilize such technical know-how, so it was doubtful that
they could benefit from such transfer. In effect, Japan was inculpated
for imposing a development strategy on the ASEAN economies that keeps
them from attaining their maximum potential. Japan is willing to respond
to the development needs of the ASEAN but it always ends up branded as a
greedy, insensitive, economic animal.
As Japan's international economic role grows, it will have to expend
more and more resources on international affairs. Such expenditures
depend on domestic approval, particularly that of the private business
sector who finances a substantial proportion of the Japanese
government's budgets. The Japanese government must them be responsive
to both domestic and international demands, while simultaneously
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reconciling their differences.
To discard its image as an economic animal Japan has tried to
venture into regional and military issues but it was rebuked as a
dominator, an aggressor, and accused of toying with the idea of
remilitarization. In recent years, with all the emphasis on cultural
exchange with the ASEAN, Japan is even accused of cultural imperialism
for apparently the ASEAN population is only interested in Japanese
scholarships and not Japanese culture and ethics.
Japan is simply frustrated. It feels that no matter what it does,
it can never satisfy the high expectations of ASEAN governments and
peoples. Japan is tired of being continually squeezed to pay for its
past and it hard-earned economic success. The country wants equality
and acceptance in its relationship with the ASEAN but the ASEAN seems to
apply a different standard when viewing Japan, one that is unfairly high
and often overly critical.
True, at times Japan is not very responsive to ASEAN requests and
needs but only because of constraints resulting from its practice of
consensus politics. The giving of economic aid is one of the least
contentious issues between the various political parties and factions.
Budget proposals for development aid are usually passed without much
debate and few amendments, there is a consensus among the parties that
development aid to the ASEAN and other developing countries is an
absolute necessity for Japan's national interests. However, on other
aspects of aid there is less agreement. A paragon is the ASEAN's
requests for liberalization of the Japanese market for ASEAN products.
There are pressures from farm groups, labor unions, and other interest
groups who are wary of the economic consequences of full-scale
liberalization on their professions and livelihood. Even among the
various government ministries, they find it difficult to reconcile their
differences to come to any point of agreement on the aims and terms of
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aid. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs feels that aid should be more
generous as it is a tool to advance Japan's standing arid influence in
the world community. To MITI, aid is part of Japan's national economic
strategy for the development and reorganization of the domestic economy
towards high-tech and clean industries by moving labor- and resource-
intensive industries overseas and aid should be used to facilitate this
transformation. The Finance Ministry is against any measure that would
compromise Japan's economic interests in the slightest way. It opposes
any tariff cut on imports and imposes relatively high interest rate on
ODA loans. The Prime Minister uses aid to build up support from the
ASEAN to strengthen his own standing among the industrialized countries.
Another problem in dispensing aid to the ASEAN is that Japan thinks
the ASEAN governments do not know how to effectively use funds and
assistance. There is growing Japanese sensitivity on more careful
monitoring of Japanese aid. Much to the chagrin of the Japanese, the
ASEAN countries are notorious for their widespread corruption. Another
is the ASEAN's inneptness in handling Japanese and other foreign
assistance. Neither are there any high standard infrastructure to
efficently manage forign aid donations. Together these realities have
made it very difficult for Japan to channel developments funds to those
that are truly in need. For example, the agricultural sector of the
ASEAN countries is desperately in need of capital and technology. But
dominated by small farmers and the absence of any effective channels for
them to make known to Japan their needs or for Japan to disburse aid to
them without going through a myriad of government procedures have
impeded improvement in Japanese assistance to them.
This iswhy Japan prefers bilateral to multilateral assistance as the
former- much to the vexation of the recipient ASEAN countries- permits
tighter Japanese scrutinization on the effective application of
transferred funds and technology.
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Although the ASEAN is still the largest beneficiary of Japanese
assistance, the Japanese government had recently cited some problems
that may hinder Japan's aid distribution to the ASEAN. First, rising
protectionism in the industrialized countries may reduce Japan's surplus
and ability to assist third world development. Japan will have to
channel more resources into overcoming these barriers through overseas
investments in the developed countries, a process that is already
happening. Second, the burgeoning third world debt will pressure Japan
to do more to relief this problem. Third, persistent food shortages and
agricultural development problems in Africa will demand greater aid
contributions from Japan. Finally, low export prices for primary
commodities may result in Japan directing more resources into the
agricultural and agro-industrial sectors and not into the developing
countries' manufacturing and service industries.2
There are difficulties for the ASEAN as well in accepting Japanese
economic aid. In the past, private Japanese loans bound by largely
unfavorable terms dominated Japanese aid to the ASEAN, adding to their
already heavy debt burdens and enlarging their dependence on Japan. The
little government grants that were given were often in the form of goods
credits or were.tied to purchase of Japanese products. The ASEAN
complained that its lack of supervisory control over projects and
autonomy in allocating funds cut down the effectiveness of assistance.
Although technical assistance was quite substantial, they were ill-
designed to suit the ASEAN's needs and not advance enough to prepare the
ASEAN economies for their economic development.
Although today Japan has untied most of its aid to the ASEAN, much
of these difficulties still exist and new ones have emerged. Japanese
yen loans still make up a large portion of aid to the ASEAN. The yen's
spiralling appreciation since 1985 has greatly increased the debt burden
of these economies. In the case of Malaysia, its yen debt rose by
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almost 80 percent from 1985 to 1988.3 Yet they cannot affort to forego
these loans because they have to sustain their rapid development.
Today most of the ASEAN population is not expressing(or would not
want to) any negative sentiments against Japan because they know that
their country's development is tenaciously linked to Japan. Japan is
now the largest foreign investor in the ASEAN. Nearly half of all
foreign investments flowing into the region comes from Japan.4 Some
interpret Japanese investments as a threat to local indigenous
businesses and a detriment to indigenous economic incentives. For
example, five Japanese department stores now dominate Singapore's retail
scene.5 Japanese investments have also inflicted serious enivronmental
problems. Chemical wastes from Japanese industrial plants have polluted
rivers and other waterways, the indiscriminate cutting of trees for
lumber exports to Japan has caused disastrous landslides destroying
lives and properties, affecting the ecology of the tropical rain
forests. Albeit Japan is becoming more aware of the environmental
impact of its assistance, it is not doing enough to stop or ameliorate
these damages.
Another problem with Japanese investments is that by treating the
ASEAN countries as one corporate entity, Japan tends to overlook the
geographical and cultural difference among these countries.
Over the years, Japan has financed many ASEAN industrial and socio-
economic development projects but the ASEAN countries do not get any
assistance in the upkeep of these understakings. To sustain
operation, the ASEAN would have no choice but to borrow more-
frequently from Japanese banks.
Although the ASEAN economies now welcome Japanese investments and
any other type of economic cooperation with Japan, there may come a time
when resentment against Japan will affect bilateral relations because of
the continuing asymmetry in Japan-ASEAN relations. Some ASEAN elites
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fear that the ASEANs increasing reliance on Japan may give rise to a
dependency syndrome that may influence the indigenous perception of a
colonial relationship. Furthermore, Japanese investments may promote
economic development but sometimes they widen the socio-economic gap of
the recipient country. Social tensions may cause internal social
instability and disrupt the development process.
The ASEAN states fear that economic dependence on Japan may reduce
them to economic and political subervience to Japan, so that these
states would gradually lose their independence.
Economic nationalism may grow as these economies prosper or when
their people can no longer accept a domination of Japanese capital and
businesses in their economies, or both.
Japan-ASEAN relations will continue to draw closer because of their
inter-dependence for security and development. However, persistence of
income, trade, dependence and perception gaps would create real and
pressing problems between them. ASEAN, the weaker partner, feeling its
interests compromised wants more and better assistance from Japan while
Japan, the stronger party, is annoyed at what appears to be exaggerated
concerns and unreasonable demands of the ASEAN. The two sides must try
to promote better mutual understanding to erase their mutual misgivings
for fruitful cooperation in the years to come.
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CHAPTER VI
ASEAN RESPONSE TO JAPAN: PAST AND PRESENT
Throughout the 1950s to the 1970s, resentment feelings against Japan
ran high among the ASEAN population. Japanese investments and aid were
interpreted as part of a grand design to control Southeast Asia by
establishing their economic dependence on Japan.
At this time, the spread of communism in Asia reinforced America's
obsession with the Domino Theory, causing Washington to send enormous
amount of economic and military aid to Southeast Asia to cordon
communist expansion and suppress domestic communist insurgencies. The
Philippine government of Magsaysay received strong U.S. assistance in
eliminating the lluks Marcos managed to stay in power for nearly two
decades with the backing of the U.S. because of his fierce anti-
communist stance.
So throughout this period, the fight for political dominance took
precedence over economic development. The Asian governments could count
on Washington for aid because of the confrontational politics of the
time and Washington's determination to build up free, democratic
states.
By the late 1970s, regional tensions were easing, paving way for
economic development. Because of this, the ASEAN's need for foreign
capital, technology, and markets was greatly enhanced.
American aid was no longer as generous as it used to be because of
the pacific atmosphere of the region and American commitments in the
Middle East and its domestic economic crisis. Concurrently, it was the
genesis of a new era of Japanese diplomacy. To expand its regional and
international role, it significantly raised and improved its assistance
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to the ASEAN countries. Thus, Japan's economic importance to the region
was dramatically magnified.
Tanaka's 1975 visit to the ASEAN was a watershed in Japan-ASEAN
relations. Since then, Japan's aid to the region has improved
significantly beginning with Fukuda's heart-to-heart diplomacy to
Takeshita's international village concept. A $10 billion Philippine Aid
Package(PAP) for the Philippines was endorsed by Japan. Imports from
the region increasingly enormously. Disbursement of the $2 billion ASEAN
Fund set up by Takeshita in 1987 is progressing well. As part of its
aid doubling efforts, Japanese ODA to the region is expected to reach
$50 billion within the five years from 1988.
Although the ASEAN states welcome Japanese aid and investments,
many complaints are still waged against Japan. Dumping, inadequate
transfer of production technology, and seclusion of indigenous people
from key management and technical posts in Japanese businesses are
greivances carried over from the past.
Some new problems have also surfaced. Some ASEAN nationals feel
that there is excessive Japanese cooperation with ethnic Chinese in
Southeast Asia. The ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia(except Brunei)
exert great leverage over the ASEAN economies because of their wealth
and business connections. Indigenous Southeast Asians charge that
Japanese cooperation with the Chinese would only widen the already large
socio-economic gap between the ethnic Chinese and the natives, leading
to social unrest.
Second, since all the ASEAN economies adopt export-led growth
strategies, it is crucial for them to find markets for their exports.
The ASEAN complain that Japanese actions to liberalize the Japanese
market are largely symbolic substantial changes are too little, too
late to rectify their huge trade imbalances. Although ASEAN exports to
Japan has increased tremendously, the complicated Japanese system for
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goods distribution and Japanese government enforced-product standards
are still great obstacles to penetration into the Japanese market.
Close Japan-China economic ties have stirred ASEAN discontentment.
Some Southeast Asians regard China as a competitor for Japanese aid.
This is especially true for the Indonesian whose country used to receive
most Japanese aid for a single country before China became the largest
Japanese aid recipient in 1982.
Besides these, there is a Japanese image problem. Japanese are
regarded pejoratively as economic animals but it is Japanese arrogance
and chauvinism that is most unbearable. Southeast Asians regard
Japanese as Asians because of the latter's physical appearance and
Japan's geographic location therefore, the two should treat each other
as equals. But Southeast Asians feel that Japanese often see themselves
as a superior and a member of the industrialized West when dealing with
other Asian peoples. Moreover, Southeast Asians are annoyed by Japan's
frequent emphasis on its people's uniqueness and cultural oneness
when the Southeast Asians take pride in their cultural diversity.
Japanese residing in Southeast Asia and other places often distant
themselves from the local community, further consolidating Southeast
Asian's perception of Japanese aloofness and clannishness.
Furthermore, the ASEAN states are dismayed by the absence of a sense
of equal partnership in their relationship with Japan. Japan, with its
economic strength, practically dictates the region's economies through
its bilateral assistance packages and investments.
Within the ASEAN, there is much difference in each member state's
attitude toward Japan. Indonesia, the largest of the lot, has always
favored neutrality of the region from any major power influence so that
it can establish its own dominance within the organization. While
Singapore, a small city-state, welcomes the Japanese presence to reduce
indonesia's regional demnance and for economic reasons as well
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iuaiiana and Malaysia also welcome greater Japanese presence in the
region for the same reasons. The Philippines has been least dependent
on Japanese capital and technology because of its close relationship
with the U.S. This is gradually changing as U.S. aid falls and anti-
U.S. sentiments rise in the country. Aquino has obtained several soft-
term loans from Japan since her ascendency to power two years ago. It
is acknowledged that rehabilitation of the Philippine economy will rely
heavily on Japanese assistance whether the country likes it or not.
In view of the developments in the international environment, some
ASEAN leaders are pleased to see Japan increasing its involvement in the
region's political affairs. Japan is accepted as a regional leader. It
has acted as spokesman for ASEAN interests at the Big Seven Summits.
But a recent Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs opinion poll indicated
that over 90 percent of ASEAN nationals surveyed said they appreciate
Japan's economic and technical cooperation with the region but would not
want Japan to act as a peacekeeping force in the region.' There are
worries that Japanese aid would be used to obtain ASEAN acquiesence to
Japanese military expansion and that growing defense spending would
affect the size of Japanese aid. (However, an unofficial Diet consensus
stipulated that annual ODA increases should be greater than those of the
defense budget.)
ASEAN anxieties concerning Japan's military intentions- and
economic ones- are not likely to disappear quickly. The ASEAN's
criticisms of Japan typifies much of those of the developing countries'
reactions to Japanese policies.' Japan will have to work hard to
overcome ASEAN suspicions and convince Southeast Asians of its peaceful
intentions.
The ASEAN governments also feel themselves trapped in a dilemma. On
one hand, an overwhelming inflow of Japanese capital investments and
loans would create a dependency syndrome, increase their debt burdens
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less advantageous position in their relationship. But the growing
prosperity of these economies would raise the economic nationalism of
the Southeast Asians, causing them to seek more equal and equitable
cooperation with Japan. Dissatisfaction now suppressed may turn into
full-blown conflicts and hamper economic and political cooperative
efforts between the two. Better mutual understanding is important. In
addition, both should re-examine their interests and expectations,
adjusting them to a realistic and mutually acceptable level so that




Perhaps no other country in the world today should appreciate
cooperative interdependence and peace more than Japan. Flanked by the
intimidating presence of two communist giants and a radical communist
regime in North Korea- all at one time spoils of Japanese militarism in
East Asia- while legally deterred from rearming, Japan's sense of
vulnerability is great and real. This sentiment is further magnified by
the country's poverty of natural resources and energy, forcing the
country to rely heavily on economic exchange with foreign countries for
its own economic survival.
Any form of economic embargo against Japan could gravely threaten
its well-being. Without food imports the people would starve. Without
raw materials, it cannot produce goods or services for local consumption
or export to earn dollars for purchases. Without oil its industries
cannot function. Not a single bomb has to be dropped to paralyze the
Japanese economy or to strangle its population.
Its insecurity is reflected by the country's aggressiveness in
harnessing overseas sources of raw materials and energy and foreign
markets for its exports, its huge foreign reserves and the dynamism of
the Japanese economy in creating new technology and products.
It is ironical that Japan, being one of the most vulnerable
economies in the world, would rise to become the most productive
economy, while simultaneously its economic wealth would become its most,
potent- and perhaps only effective- diplomatic tool. This explains
why Japanese foreign policies are almost always economic-oriented.
Relations with foreign states generally revolve around trade.
Thc Ad q to demonstrate why Japan has to build up a strong Japanese
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economy not only for economic existence but also to exercise its
political influence in a world dominated by ideologies and superpower
arm races.
In the 1970s, the two OPEC oil embargoes warned Japan of its
economic vulnerability to any sudden external changes because of the
country's rigid dependence on resource imports. Politically, declining
U.S. military strength vis-a-vis the Soviet Union reinforces Japan's
anxieties, further confirming its weakness and helplessness in
responding to these developments.
The Comprehensive National Security Strategy came about as a
consequence of these and many other international developments. The
strategy aims at effectively utilizing Japan's global economic clout to
promote the country's intricately inter-woven economic, defense and
political interests through economic cooperation with and assistance to
foreign states. Financial incentives are used to encourage peaceful
settlements of political, economic or military conflicts in the world
community and development activities in the third world so that Japan
can continue its development in a peaceful and stable international
environment.
More recently, the rising tide of protectionism in the U.S. and
Europe, the impending unification of the Economic Community, and souring
U.S.-Japan relations due to trade conflicts indicated some very ominous
signs to its economic interests in these important high-consumption
markets.
Heightening international pressure on Japan to bear greater global
responsibilities.in commensuration to its economic strength makes Japan
more aware of its isolation by the world community in vital global
political issues. And with economic strength comes the desire for
international political prominence. Japan has therefore made expansion
of the country's global status and Dower one of the main goals of its
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Comprehensive National Security Strategy aside from advancing its
economic interests.
As communist China and the Soviet Union and the rest of the
communist world slowly liberalize their economies. Japan hopes that
closer economic ties with them would give rise to more pragmatic,
stable, and rational communist governments, thereby minimizing the
chances of them attacking Japan or any other states that may be valuable
sources of materials and markets for Japan. This in effect would
promote its own security as well as the peace, stability, and prosperity
of the world.
The ASEAN countries feature prominently in Japan's Comrephensive
National Security Strategy due to their strategic economic and Political
importance to Japan. The destiny of Japan and the ASEAN states is
seemingly inseparable. During the last world war, Japan had tried to
incorporate these Southeast Asian economies into its own" Co-Prosperity
Sphere." Domination of them was to significantly reduce western
imperialist influence in the region as Japan asserts its global
political ambitions. Today with the colonial powers gone, the region is
no less important to Japan and may have even become more significant to
Japan's precarious existence. But with its military prowess gone and
replaced by economic muscles, economic cooperation and assistance has
become the core of Japan-ASEAN relations.
Their geographic location demands their cooperation and ability to
safeguard the freedom and safety of major sea lines of communication
that are absolutely crucial for transporting materials and energy to
Japan. Their immense agricultural and mineral resources could satisfy
many of Japan's domestic reources needs. At the same time, these
rapidly developing economies could become important potential markets
for Japanese capital and commodities. With their bountiful human and
natural resources and craving for foreign capital investments and
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technology, they could serve to facilitate Japan's own industrial
restructuring, transferring many of its labor-, resource- and space-
demanding manufacturing operations to the ASEAN countries. Moreover, as
the Indochinese economies slowly open up to capitalist market
incentives, the ASEAN economies could help Japan launch its Indochinese
policy to tap the resources and markets of these stagnant but
potentially vibrant economies. The ASEAN's diplomatic support for Japan
would be a boon to Japan's position as a regional leader and consolidate
and raise Japan's standing among the developed countries, helping it to
move closer to attaining some long-desired objectives, including a
permanent seat in the U.N.'s Security Council.
Indeed with the ASEAN being one of the fasting growing regions in
the developing world, successful development of these economies with
Japanese assistance could become a showcase for Japan and a relevant
model for other developing countries. For instance, the Philippine Aid
Plan, the multilateral initiative assistance package, sponsored mainly
by Japan with U.S. endorsement to bail out the economically strapped
Philippines, would show Japanese generosity and responsibility.
Cooperation with Japan would bring the ASEAN economies much-needed
capital and technology at a time when Washington, traditionally the most
generous benefactor to the region, is under severe economic pressure to
cut its federal budget to alleviate the country's serious debt problem.
And with rising trade barrriers in the U.S. and European markets, these
export-led developing economies need the Japanese market for trade to
finance their industrialization. Most ASEAN leaders recognized that
their country's future is linked to cooperation with Japan.
Their cooperation has been rewarding to both parties. The booming
ASEAN economies continue their development with Japanese capital aid and
investments and the technology that comes with them. Their exports to
Japan enjoy preferential entry. Japan has become the largest ai
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donor, creditor, foreign investor and trading partner of the region.
The group's interests and needs are better reflected to the developed
countries through Japan who often act as the organization's spokesman in
Washington and summit conferences of the industrialized countries.
Japan has seen its regional and international status greatly enhanced by
the diplomatic support of the ASEAN. Its economy has benefitted from
the cheap labor, resources and goods of the ASEAN region, assisting its
domestic industrial restructuring and helping some of its goods to
remain price competitive in international markets. Their cooperation
could make both more independent of the U.S. by strengthening their
bargaining position against Washington.
Both growing Japanese and Southeast Asian awareness of their
strengths and anger at America's blame it on others attitude for all
its economic woes have made them more independent and more conscious of
the need for cooperation in economic, political and defense matters.
There are now more talks on collective security among the ASEAN states
and collective efforts with Japan and other Asian nations to promote the
security and prosperity of the entire Asian-Pacific region.
It is therefore clear that the ASEAN is important to Japan as Japan
is to the ASEAN but their intense cooperation has also produced some
problems in their relationship. These problems if not carefully
attended, to could develop into great obstacles and impede Japan-ASEAN
cooperation.
As Japan's economic presence in Southeast Asia grows, worries of
Japanese exploitation and dominance pervades among Southeast Asians.
Most southeast Asians and their governments acknowledge their countries'
reliance on Japan is an undeniable reality but memories of Japanese
hegemony in the last war are vivid in their minds. Strong misgivings of
Japanese strategies, tactics and motives persist among many ASEAN
leaders and elites. Many of these ASEAN elites accept the necessity for
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Japan to assume a greater regional and world role for their benefit as
much as for Japan's yet, there are fears of Japan rearming consequent
to Japan's expanding political responsibilities.
Japanese investments to the ASEAN have increased rapidly in the past
few years. In the first half of 1988, Japanese capital investments to
the region reached $1.26 billion, nearly matching the 1.52 billion
invested in all of 1987.1 Such large investments could arouse
nationalist sentiments against this overwhelming Japanese economic
presence in the ASEAN. In the 1970s, such sentiments erupted during the
Tanaka visit. Although at present there isn't any strong, visible
opposition to Japan's economic dominance within the ASEAN, anti-Japanese
feelings may build as nationalism grows in a prospering economy. There
are already criticisms that Japanese investments could destroy
indigenous economic incentives and intensify competition in the host
economy.
But despite all the shortcomings and criticisms of Japanese aid and
investments in the ASEAN, they have contributed immensely to the
development of industrial infrastructures and human. resources in these
economies. For example, Japan's Yamata group was responsible for
constructing the first Southeast Asian integrated steelwork plant in
Malaysia at a cost of $75 million, plus roads and telecommunication
networks in Singapore, the biggest shipbuilding and ship-repair yard in
Southeast Asia was erected with Japanese capital and technology,
supporting Singapore's busy entrepot trade and a highly modern
telecommunication system to help make this tiny city-state one of the
most important banking and financial centers in the world and in
Indonesia, Japan practically launched the country's domestic oil
industry.2
Obviously, Japan's foreign aid and overseas investments are
economcally motivated in line with its economic policy of
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"diversification and internationalization, which is a part of its
Comprehensive National Security Strategy to overcome barriers to exports
and securing resources from a variety of sources. Moreover, rising
costs of land and labor and environmental concerns in Japan put pressure
on moving many Japanese industries overseas.
Just how far aid should be disinterested and how far the donor
should expect commercial returns is hard to say. Some criticized aid as
an instrument that only serves the donor's vital interests.
Economically, the recipient country's economy could be controlled by the
hegemony of human, capital and material resources. Politically, aid
enables the donor to exercise hegemonic influence by maintaining a
certain type of political or economic system. Militarily, aid usually
leads to the formation of a perimeter of defense. Culturally, aid may
facilitate the transfer of values and norms from the donor-country to
the recipient-country which may encourage trade and other bilateral
activities.
In my view, it is absolutely justifiable for the donor to expect
some form of commercial compensation for its contributions so long as
the assistance is not given solely to exploit. This is because the
donor-country's government has to be accountable to its people. Also
the government frequently enlist the help of the private sector in these
foreign assistance programs. There is much sympathy for the plight of
the third world but private companies cannot just freely give away money
for they too have their commitments and have to be accountable to their
shareholders and customers. This is especially true for Japan whose
private sector contributes much to the country's aid budget in economic
cooperation through capital loans and investments and technology
transfer.
The problem with Japan's aid policy is that Japan is still trying to
define its role and objectives in the international community. It talks
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about internationalization through global cooperation but that
shouldn't be the only means to attain this goal. Over-emphasis on
economic cooperation would not change Japan's negative image as an
economic animal. On the contrary, it may reinforce foreign suspicions
of Japanese greed, considering all Japanese aid efforts to be
economically motivated.
Japan must work to convince foreign states of its benevolent
objectives and make them understand Japan's needs and constraints in
extending assistance to them. Japan must more actively and
constructively participate in the problems of the international
community: alleviating the third world debt problem, fostering North-
South relations, developing private and public think tanks or a
collaboration of both to act a meeting ground for developed and
developing countries to work together on global economic, political and
environmental issues. The participation of the third world is of
particular importance as they would know precisely what their needs are
and the appropriate solutions to these problems. Establishment of
research and training centers, promotion of Japanese studies and
international cooperation in Japan and in foreign countries could
facilitate better understanding of Japan by foreign communities. It
would indicate Japanese willingness and capacity to play a larger
internatioanl role for global peace, prosperity and stability.
Although Japan is now the largest global aid donor in dollar terms
it is still widely criticised for not giving enough in proportion to its
GNP. But it must be recalled that the the private sector of the
Japanese economy. is very important in Japan's aid programs and the
Japanese government must therefore mobilize the private enterprises to
expand their involvement in their country's aid program.
The Japanese government should provide greater incentives for
private enterprises to assist in the development of manpower, resources
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and industries in the third world. For instance, tax breaks may be
given for humanitarian efforts at improving socio-economic conditions in
the host country in which the Japanese company operates, including the
training of teachers, medical aid, housing resettlement projects for the
homeless and slum dwellers in overpopulated urban centers, agricultural
technology and equipment transfers to farmers. Most developing
economies desire the production technology of Japanese enterprises
thus, the latter should be encouraged to transfer such technical and
management know-how to the former either through their own efforts in
creating training programs or work with the Japanese government and
international agencies such as the United Nations and the Asian
Development Bank. At the same time the Japanese government must provide
greater access to the Japanese market, breaking down its trade barriers
and involve local industries in introducing foreign products into the
Japanese market.
To counter the rising of nationalism and debates on the developed
countries' role in third world development by intellectuals and elites.
Japan will have to promote greater understanding. with them through
personnel exchange and cooperation so that they would appreciate Japan's
anxieties and hence its resulting policies. With better understanding,
they could work together to reconcile their differences and produce
mutually.beneficial policies to satisfy each's development needs.
In contributing to regional security, Japan should not engage in any
large-scale military build up nor any form of military technology
transfer and strictly prohibit the transfer and export of arms to avoid
evoking foreign antagonism towards Japan. Many developing countries
like the ASEAN states welcome Japan's expanding global prominence but
there are deep-seated suspicions of Japanese motives.
The Japanese population is very much behind their government's
development aid programs. Gradually they are coming to terms with
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internationalization. With over 60 percent of the population born after
the war and growing up in a prospering Japanese society and having the
opportunity to learn what the world thinks of Japan through travelling,
the media and other channels, they are more aware of Japan's strength
and commensurate responsibilities in the world. They must then be
educated to learn not only of their country's strength and what they can
do with that for their benefit but also how to use this influence for
the betterment of the world community. Their support and belief in the
significance of their country's aid programs to their own security and
the security of the world is very important to the future of Japan's aid
policy and relations with the developed and developing countries.
An unexpected obstacle to growing Japanese largess is Washington's
negative attitude towards it. Washington had in the past complained of
Japan's past reluctance in giving aid but today with increasing Japanese
generosity, the U.S. is offended by Japan's large contributions to many
multilateral agencies. U.S. is afraid of losing its voting edge within
these organizations and gradually its international dominance and
prestige. For example, when Japan offered to give more to the World
Bank, the U.S. blocked the move for fear that trade usually follows
aid, giving the Japanese an even larger share of the aid-recipients'
markets.3
Despite their differences, Japan and the ASEAN states will certainly
move closer for their security and development needs. Although with its
financial wealth, Japan does have great leverage in cooperative efforts
with the ASEAN, it does not wholly dominate the ASEAN economies because
its reliance on.the ASEAN is no less than their reliance on Japan.
Their cooperation could create an epochal change effect on the future of
the Asian-Pacific region and contributing to regional and global peace,
stability and development.
Although the popularity of Japan's* ruling Liberal Democratic Party
103
has plunged to its lowest point in post-war Japan because of the
embarassing Recruit Cosmos scandal, the party is still the strongest in
Japanese politics. The scandal should not have any real impact on the
Japanese government's aid policy as this change of administration was
only a political manoeuver to halt the deteriorating effect of the
scandal on the LDP's position in domestic politics. A strong consensus
on aid and Japan's overall foreign policy in compliance with its
Comprehensive National Security Strategy still exists. Before his
departure from the prime minister's office, Takeshita made a farewell
tour of the ASEAN, indicative of the importance Japan attaches to good
relations with these Southeast Asian governments.
Himself troubled by his lurid implication in the scandal and facing
an imminent resignation, his lame-duck government was not able to make
any substantial promises to the ASEAN's requests for lower interest
rates on Japanese yen loans and financial and technical support for
these governments' development projects. Nevertheless, he assured the
ASEAN governments of his successor and the Japanese government's
dedication to improve and increase assistance to these Southeast Asian
countries.
His hand-picked successor, Sosuke Uno, was foreign minister of
Takeshita's cabinet and once director of MITI. His tenure as foreign
minister, familiarized him with the ASEAN region and his country's
foreign and aid policies toward the ASEAN. Many times he had travelled
to the region for the organization's ministerial meetings and
accompanied Takeshita during his visit to Manila for the Third ASEAN
Summit in 1987. He played an important role in implementing Takeshita's
aid packages to the region and development aid to other developing areas
and international institutions. Although Uno's is only expected to
finish his predecessor's two-year term which expires this October, the
likelihood of him getting appointed for a second term is great as he is
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one of the few old guards within the party that is untainted by the
scandal. He is expected to carry out party reforms to cleanse the party
and restore its public image. As he tackles with internal reforms, his
experience in the foreign office and MITI will be invaluable to him in
defending Japan against aggravating U.S. protectionist policies with
bills like the recent Super 301 which targets Japan and in sustaining
Japan's friendship with the ASEAN.
A strong national censensus now prevails in Japan on the necessity
of the JSDF to the country's defense. As much Japanese wariness
pervades on America's faltering commitment to their country's defense.
Another problem is that Japan's trade conflicts with the U.S. have
spilled over into other aspects of their relationship. Many Japanese
are enraged by America's unending whining about unfair Japanese trade
practices when they reckon that Japan has been making significant
unilateral efforts in addressing the issue since the trade war began in
the early 1980s, while the U.S. has done little to improve its own
economy other than drawing one protectionist bill after another with all
of them pointing at Japan.
Along with these developments in Japan-U.S. relations, the Japanese
public is becoming more conscious of their nation's strength, giving
rise to surging nationalism and opposition to America's military
presence.in Japan. Fortification of its defense capabilities therefore
becomes important in convincing the Japanese people and foreign states
that Japan is a sovereign state capable of protecting itself. Such
emotions would prompt the government to increase its defense
expenditures.
This strong Japanese ambition to safeguard its security is reflected
by Japan's eagerness in obtaining advance American aerospace technology
through joint-manufacture of the FSX. Although this move may be
economically motivated to help launch Japan's own commercial aircraft
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and satellite-launching business(the number of satellites launched by
Japan annually is only exceeded by the U.S. and U.S.S.R.), it can enable
Japan to independently improve its own defense capabilities.
But no large-scale militarization is likely to occur because of the
impracticality of it due to Japan's demographic distribution and its
proximity to China and the Soviet Union, making it extremely vulnerable
to pre-emptive attacks. Another worry is the economic repercussion
militarization would have on the Japanese economy. For instance,
Nakasone visit of the Yasukuni Shrine and controversy over the revision
of Japanese history textbooks had angered people in Hong Kong, North and
South Korea, China and Southeast Asia. People in Hong Kong boycotted
Japanese goods which directly compromises Japan's economic, hence,
security interests.
Increasing Japanese defense expenditure is not really a foreboding
sign of Japanese re-armament. Every country has a right to defend
itself it is a government's obligation to its people. Japan accepts
the reality that full-scale military build up is simply not an advisable
option because of economic, political and legal constraints. Even with
all its financial resources it cannot become totally independent in its
defense. Hence, its security arrangements with the U.S. is still firmly
supported by the Japanese government. Japan tries to make their
implementation as smooth as possible- financially contributing to the
upkeep of American personnel and facilities in Japan and engaging in
defense-related research and development activities with the U.S. The
possibility of nuclear proliferation is most unlikely because of the
presence of a non-nuclear policy, a bulwark in Japan's defense policy,
and popular Japanese opposition to it as the Japanese people had been
the only victims of atomic explosion.
A lot of the defense budget actually goes to and compensation for
JSDF personnel and maintenance of American troops in Japan. What Japan
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really wants to achieve with its defense budget is not a physical
expansion of the forces rather an improvement of the JSDF's monitoring
and deterring capabilities, e.g., satellites, submarines, etc, and
engaging in more defense-related R and D activities with the U.S.,
transferring its technical know-how to the U.S. to help strengthen the
U.S. military in order to ensure the security of the entire free world.
As to the effect of the recent violent suppression of the student
democratic movement in China by the Chinese government on Japan-ASEAN
relations, it may be a bit too early to make any solid projections. The
bloodly massacre of thousands of peaceful demonstrators and the current
propaganda to stifle the democracy movement certainly shakes the
confidence of foreign investors in China. Japan is one of the largest
aid donors and foreign investors to Communist China. Both China and
Japan would stand to lose a lot should the Chinese regime fail to
restore its credibility, thus further reducing foreign confidence in
China. Japan has already evacuated most of its nationals in China and
many credit and commercial contracts has been frozen.
Japan's response to China should largely depend.on Japan's degree of
dependence on Chinese raw materials and the Chinese market, which at the
moment does not seem to be severe. Most Japanese investments in China
aims at reaping profits in the long-run so Japanese businessmen are
willing to suffer a little in the short-term, perhaps suspending
operations in China or sharply reducing investments in the country until
its future looks more secure. If circumstances allow, Japan-Chinese
trade relations should continue to develop as Japan believes that an
economically wealthier and more stable China would allow the whole Asian
region peace and stability, hence contributing to Japan's security and
fulfilling its aspirations for leadership with the Asian-Pacific region.
However, people-to-people contacts between Japan and China would
drastically be affected for fear of the safety of Japanese nationals
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travelling, studying or residing in China. Moreover, the Chinese
government may itself seek to limit people-to-people contacts with the
Japanese and other foreign nationals as part of its strategy to suppress
the students and intellectuals, stressing only economic cooperation.
The ASEAN countries had been terrified by the fanaticism and
expansionist policies of Beijing in the 1950s and 1960s. Although the
states have working diplomatic relations with China, they are not
particularly close to China for they view China as a formidable economic
competitor and that China cannot be a partner in their economic
development as the latter can offer them little in capital and
technology. These countries will certainly maintain their diplomatic
ties with China but some of them will most likely opt for broader
economic cooperation with the Taiwan government. This include countries
like the Philippines and Taiwan whose ethnic Chinese population are more
closely affiliated to the Taiwan government. And like Japan and Chinese
relations, people-to-people ties between the ASEAN and China will be
severely strained.
So in the short-run, more Japanese investments will likely flow into
the ASEAN economies and the likelihood of collective security efforts
between the two will be enhanced.
On the future of Japan-ASEAN relations a few scenarios would emerge.
With closer economic and diplomatic cooperation and developments in the
international environments like a declining U.S. and growing nationalism
in these countries, the two may join together and formally establish
some sort of Asian-Pacific collective security and economic cooperation
organization with Japan assuming a leadership role within this
organization, something which has been prosposed and speculated on by
many Asian experts and these governments for many years.
The likelihood of this occuring is quite remote as the strong
suspicions of Japan still exist among the ASEAN population and these
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countries do not want to subjugate themselves to Japanese tutorship.
They value their independence and scars of historical tragedies during
the last war remind them of Japanese slyness and greed. Furthermore,
Japan has still not proven itself to be a capable leader with the ideals
and sincerely working for the interests of the ASEAN and other
developing countries.
The worst scenario would be a wild outburst of anti-Japanese
sentiments arising out of the ASEAN's debt problems which are seriously
exacerbated by their large yen-dominated loans. Their inability to
service these debts may produce spiralling inflation, stagnation, or
worse, a recession, destroying all that these countries have achieved in
the past decade. Such sentiments may also be stirred up by the
overwhelming Japanese economic presence in the ASEAN economies, creating
a real or illusive picture of Japanese hegemony. The possiblity of this
occuring now or within the next three years is not very great as Japan
is also trying to amend the inequalities in their relationship and the
new prime minister, having much experience in dealing with the ASEAN,
should be aware of the the negative consequence for Japan by ignoring
the demands of the ASEAN and hence would act accordingly to ensure
smooth cooperation. The ASEAN governments and population see the
importance of cooperation with Japan for their own economic development
therefore, they would not want to jeopardize their amiable relations
with Japan unless the prevailing circumstances make it absolutely
impossible.
The most likely future of Japan-ASEAN relations, at least in the
next three to five years, is that the two sides would continue to expand
the scope of their economic and diplomatic cooperation. Together they
may help to open up the Indochinese economies and move toward closer
integration of the Asian-Pacific economies, including Australia and New
Zealand who host enormous Japanes investments and are also deeply
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interests in economic cooperation with the ASEAN economies. Closer
collective security cooperation may also result but in an informal
context. Already there is much less opposition to the JSDF among the
ASEAN countries and some like Singapore and Brunei even appreciate a
greater Japanese security role in the region.
The ASEAN is only one part- though a very important one- of
Japan's Comprehensive National Security Strategy so other than good
relations with the ASEAN countries, Japan shall be expected to cultivate
good relations with other countries deem to be crucial to attaining the
goals of this security strategy, viz., peace, stability and prospertiy
for Japan and the rest of the world. At this month's UNHCR conference
in Geneva, Japan has pledged to accept a thousand Vietnamese
refugees. This decision is remarkable in the sense that this is the
first time Japan has ever accepted this many Vietnamese refugees. In
the past Japan had only accepted very few refugees. Financial
contributions were given instead to agencies responsible for the care
and relocation of these refugees to keep the problem from entering
Japan. So we shall expect to see a greater, Japanese role in
international affairs, broadening its influence not only in the economic
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